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WHERE ARE YOUR PAPERS?: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS
ACT, THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE, THE
CLOUD, AND ENCRYPTION
INTRODUCTION
“Where are your papers?!”  This is a well-known trope employed to
lampoon authoritarian regimes.1  Although these colloquial “papers”
are often seized by executive discretion,2 other papers enjoy very
strong protection under the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amend-
ment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures,”3 and it generally prohibits warrantless searches.4  However,
electronic systems, which are replacing the papers traditionally used
for storage and communication, complicate the analysis of what is and
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  This Comment addresses
the practical consequences of continued uncertainty over Fourth
Amendment protection of electronically stored information (ESI) and
how those consequences can be avoided.  Specifically, this Comment
asks: What constitutes the papers protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and where are those papers?
People routinely send and store sensitive information with various
service providers,5 such as photos in iCloud, documents in Dropbox,
1. See Harry Binswanger, Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants Is Not Enough, They Deserve an
Apology, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybinswanger/2013/
03/04/amnesty-for-illegal-immigrants-is-not-enough-they-deserve-an-apology/#78f4a4bd1a9c.
2. See generally Ramzi Kassem, Passport Revocation as Proxy Denaturalization: Examining
the Yemen Cases, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2099 (2014) (examining executive authority to revoke
passports).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491–95 (2014).
5. E.g., Robert Hackett, Despite Risks, Businesses Store Sensitive Data in the Cloud Unpro-
tected, FORTUNE (May 2, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/05/02/despite-risks-businesses-
store-sensitive-data-in-the-cloud-unprotected/.  An Internet service provider (ISP) provides ac-
cess to the internet. ISP Definition from PC Magazine Encyclopedia, PCMAG, http://
www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/45481/isp (last visited May 10, 2016).   “Service provider”
refers to any provider that provides services on the Internet. Service provider Definition from
PC Magazine Encyclopedia, PCMAG, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/51187/service-
provider (last visited May 10, 2016).  An ISP can be considered a subset of service providers. Id.
The terms are sometimes used interchangeably when the type of entity being referred to is clear
from the context. E.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Broadband Decisions: What Drives Consumers
1093
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e-mails in Gmail, and system backups in Crashplan.6  Under the third-
party doctrine, by revealing information to a third party, people relin-
quish their Fourth Amendment protection.7  Electronic devices, such
as a cellphone, routinely share information without any meaningful
user interaction.8  In fact, it is practically impossible for the average
user operating a device with the latest iteration of Microsoft Windows
to stop that device from communicating with the “cloud.”9
Existing legal protection for ESI is insufficient.  The Stored Com-
munications Act (SCA)10 was enacted to emulate Fourth Amendment
protection for some ESI.11  However, even for the protected ESI, the
protection provided by the decades-old SCA no longer conforms to
modern privacy expectations.  The SCA requires a warrant for the
government to search e-mails stored for less than 180 days but only a
subpoena or a court order for information stored for more than 180
days.12  Privacy expectation in remotely stored electronic information
does not diminish simply because 180 days has elapsed13 just as pri-
vacy expectation in other storage mediums does not diminish simply
because of the passage of time.
[A] landlord or storage locker owner has keys to a tenant’s space, a
bank has the keys to a safe deposit box, and a postal carrier has the
keys to a mailbox.”14  Any information in these storage mediums,
To Switch—or Stick with—Their Broadband Internet Provider (working paper) (Dec. 2010),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-303264A1.pdf.
6. See Rick Broida, How To Build a Bulletproof Cloud Backup System Without Spending a
Dime, PCWORLD (Apr. 30, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036488/how-to-
build-a-bulletproof-cloud-backup-system-without-spending-a-dime.html; Steve Ragan, A Blue
Team’s Reference Guide To Dealing with Ransomware, CSO (Mar. 22, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://
www.csoonline.com/article/3046586/techology-business/a-blue-teams-reference-guide-to-dealing-
with-ransomware.html.
7. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
8. Security Now!: Security Is Difficult (Gibson Research Corporation podcast Aug. 18, 2015)
(transcript at 3–4, 8–9), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-521.pdf.
9. Id.  (transcript at 9) (“For example, if we absolutely turn everything that we can find off,
that is, to its most privacy-enforcing settings, how does Windows 10 perform? And unfortu-
nately, it cannot resist talking to the Internet.”).
10. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 201–02, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2012)).
11. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212–14, 1218–23 (2004) (explaining the various
warrant, subpoena, and notice requirements for e-mails, content files, records, and logs stored by
the ISP).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)–(c).
13. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Princi-
ples to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2237–38
(2009) (reasoning  that electronic information should be treated the same as information stored
in private places (e.g., tenant spaces, safe deposit boxes, and mailboxes)).
14. Id.
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then, are arguably exposed to the third party.  Despite that exposure,
the third-party doctrine does not give “law enforcement the authority
to use those third parties as a means to enter a private space” like a
storage locker, a safe deposit box, or a mailbox.15  This Comment
shows that remote electronic storage is comparable to safety deposit
boxes.  Therefore, similar to Fourth Amendment expectations of pri-
vacy in a safety deposit box, and other types of secure storage, expec-
tations of privacy in electronic storage should not simply diminish with
the passage of time.16
In Riley v. California,17 the U.S. Supreme Court held that warrant-
less searches of data stored on a cellphone incident to a lawful custo-
dial arrest were unconstitutional, and the Court explicitly noted the
challenges of separating local and cloud storage.18  The data that is
physically stored on a cellphone is just a fraction of the personal data
duplicated and stored on various cloud-based services that average
consumers access using the same cellphone.19  Legal recognition of the
expectation of privacy should extend to consumer data stored in the
service provider’s physical infrastructure that is used to provide a
cloud-based service.
Strong encryption for ESI has been readily available for a long
time.20  The same techniques currently used to enable secure Internet
commerce and secure institutional communications can be used for
stored communication.21  Strong encryption commonly refers to en-
cryption that is computationally infeasible to defeat without the cor-
rect encryption key.22  Although currently not widely deployed by the
15. Id. at 2238.
16. See id. at 2237–38.
17. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
18. Id. at 2491, 2495.
19. Id. at 2491.  By design, cloud-based services provide a seamless experience that often does
not provide clear demarcations between what is stored locally versus remotely. PETER MELL &
TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145, THE
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOL-
OGY 2 (Sept. 2011), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf.
20. Security Now!: Shocked by the Shell (Gibson Research Corporation podcast Oct. 1, 2014)
(transcript at 10), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-475-notes.pdf.
21. Security Now!: Disconnect (Gibson Research Corporation podcast Sept. 15, 2015) (tran-
script at 7–8), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-525-notes.pdf. (discussing the use of key exchange pro-
tocols in secure messaging products, such as Threema and Telegram).  Key exchange protocols
are used to exchange encryption keys to secure Internet traffic.   For example, anytime a user
visits a website that displays “https” in the address bar rather than “http,” that connection is
secured by encryption that exchanged encryption keys using a key exchange protocol. See id.
(transcript at 11).
22. David Mertz, Introduction to Cryptology, Part 1: Basic Cryptology Concepts, IBM:
DEVELOPERWORKS, (Jan. 16, 2001), http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/tivoli/tutorials/s-crypto
/s-crypto.html.
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casual users for stored communication and remote file storage, strong
encryption is not new and can be readily deployed en masse if the
market demands it.23
Wide deployment of strong encryption will have dire practical con-
sequences for law enforcement because strong encryption makes it
impossible, irrespective of warrants, for law enforcement to recover
encrypted ESI.24  Strong encryption has not been widely deployed be-
cause the technical difficulties of prior implementations create a high
bar of entry, and there is a lack of interest in strong encryption by the
casual user, which prevents efforts to develop user-friendly
implementations.
Before the Snowden revelations,25 more people accepted that law
enforcement had a valid interest in intercepting and recovering infor-
mation with little restriction for investigative purposes, such as investi-
gating kidnappings or terrorist activities.26  However, in the wake of
the Snowden revelations, interest in strong encryption has increased,
and companies are making those technologies widely available in re-
sponse to consumer demand.27  If concerns over the uncertainty of
legal protections for ESI are not addressed, the combination of in-
creased interest in, and availability of, strong encryption to the casual
user will lead to mass adoption of strong encryption, leaving law en-
forcement in the dark.
This Comment argues that Congress should  amend the SCA to pro-
vide legal protection of all ESI that conforms to modern privacy ex-
pectations and rebuild the trust between law enforcement and the
people of the United States to avoid mass adoption of strong encryp-
tion and the associated security and economic consequences.  This le-
gal protection must provide, at a minimum, an expectation of privacy
that does not simply diminish with the passage of time and that
23. See Worldwide Encryption Products Survey, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Feb. 11, 2016, 11:05
AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/worldwide_encry.html (“The findings of
this survey identified 619 entities that sell encryption products.  Of those 412, or two-thirds, are
outside the U.S.-calling into question the efficacy of any US mandates forcing backdoors for law-
enforcement access. . . .  These foreign products offer a wide variety of secure applications—
voice encryption, text message encryption, file encryption, network-traffic encryption, anony-
mous currency . . . .”).
24. Security Now!: Shocked by the Shell, supra note 20, (transcript at 8–9). R
25. Edward Snowden, an ex-National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, disclosed the NSA’s
mass surveillance programs.  Barton Gellman et al., Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source
of NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, June 9, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-
leaders-push-back-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.ht
ml.
26. Security Now!: Shocked by the Shell, supra note 20, (transcript at 9). R
27. Id. (transcript at 8–9).
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removes the arbitrary distinction between communication and stor-
age.  Part II presents an overview of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, SCA case law, cloud computing, strong encryption, and the
U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of search and seizure challenges in-
herent in the cloud.28  Part III argues that the current protections do
not adhere to consumer expectations of privacy because: (1) Internet
use, which requires “disclosure” of information to third parties, has
become ubiquitous and unavoidable29 and (2) information stored with
a service provider should not be considered “disclosed” to a third
party.30  Thus, uncertainties surrounding Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of consumer information will lead to mass adoption of encryp-
tion.31  Part IV argues that if clear and understandable legal
protection is not available: (1) people will continue to develop and
adopt strong encryption that cannot be circumvented when law en-
forcement and intelligence agencies have a legitimate need to do so32
and (2) efforts to ban these technologies would have dire economic
consequences.33  Part V concludes that Congress must amend the
SCA to recognize Fourth Amendment protection for ESI, eliminate
the arbitrary 180-day rule and the distinction between storage and
communication, uphold search warrant requirements despite of the
third-party doctrine, and rebuild the trust between law enforcement
and the people of the United States to avoid the mass adoption of
strong encryption, and the associated security and economic
consequences.
II. BACKGROUND
The third-party doctrine provides that information disclosed to a
third party is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.34  The SCA
was enacted approximately thirty years ago as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 198635 to provide some Fourth
Amendment-like protection for information disclosed to service prov-
iders.36  In Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
complications brought to Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy
28. See infra notes 34–162 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 163–88 and accompanying text. R
30. See infra notes 189–203 and accompanying text. R
31. See infra notes 204–46 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 247–58 and accompanying text. R
33. See infra notes 259–305 and accompanying text. R
34. Kerr, supra note 7, at 563. R
35. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
36. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1212. R
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analysis by the expansiveness of, and social reliance on, data stored in
the cloud.37
A. Current Fourth Amendment Protection for Storage and
Communications
“The Fourth Amendment offers strong privacy protections for our
homes in the physical world.”38  The level of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection is highest with regard to a person’s home.  However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has extended Fourth Amendment protection to vari-
ous other spaces and containers.  The third-party doctrine provides
that once information is disclosed to a third party, Fourth Amendment
protection is waived.39  The justification for this rule stems from the
reasonable expectation of privacy test established in Katz v. United
States.40
In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic recording device on the
outside of a public telephone booth in which Charles Katz made tele-
phone calls to make gambling wagers.41  The Court held that Fourth
Amendment “considerations do not vanish when the search in ques-
tion is transferred from the setting of a home . . . to that of a telephone
booth” and reasoned that “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to
know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.”42  The Court emphasized that “the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places”; therefore, “[w]hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”43  The now famous test established in Justice Harlan’s
concurrence consists of a “twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’”44
37. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
38. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1209 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)). R
39. Kerr, supra note 7, at 563 (“The ‘third-party doctrine’ is the Fourth Amendment rule that R
governs collection of evidence from third parties in criminal investigations.  The rule is simple:
By disclosing to a third-party, the subject gives up all of [her] Fourth Amendment rights in the
information revealed.”  (footnote omitted)).
40. 389 U.S. 347, 361(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Kerr, supra note 7, at 563. R
41. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
42. Id. at 359.
43. Id. at 351.
44. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44
(1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information [she] voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).  The government’s bulk collection
of metadata—or “data about data,” such as sender and recipient information—as service pro-
vider business records is a distinct issue and beyond the scope of this Comment.  See Laura K.
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For instance, as far back as 1966, the Court recognized that Fourth
Amendment protection extends to a hotel room.45  However, a prop-
erty manager can consent to a warrantless search after the rental pe-
riod has expired.46  Fourth Amendment protection also extends
beyond homes or places of temporary residence to storage facilities,
storage boxes, cordless phones, and, in certain circumstances, e-
mails.47  However, not all containers enjoy Fourth Amendment
Protection.
Whether these storage containers should be afforded Fourth
Amendment protection generally depends on two factors: (1) whether
the containers are of the type that “historically command a high de-
gree of privacy” and (2) “the precautions taken by the owner to mani-
fest [her] subjective expectation of privacy.”48  In addition, “[n]either
ownership nor presence are required to assert a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy [in these containers] under the Fourth Amendment.”49
All that is required to gain Fourth Amendment protection for storage
shared with a third-party is a “formalized arrangement . . . indicating
joint control and supervision of the place.”50
Because Fourth Amendment protection for storage is important, it
is even available to a defendant who denies ownership of a rented
storage space at a storage facility.  In United States v. Dilley,51 police
officers investigating the defendant for illegal drug activity followed
the defendant to a storage facility.52  The defendant tried to escape
after the officers “initiated a stop based on . . . outstanding war-
rants.”53  After the defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and
Mirandized, the defendant was asked if “he rented a unit at the stor-
Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 757, 759–60 (2014), for an example of metadata collection.
45. “A hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a
home or an office.  The Fourth Amendment can certainly be violated by guileful as well as by
forcible intrusions into a constitutionally protected area.”  Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966) (citations omitted).  The court ultimately rejected Hoffa’s Fourth Amendment claims be-
cause his incriminating statements were made in the presence of a third party who was not a
surreptitious eavesdropper. Id. at 302.  Therefore, the court reasoned that Hoffa did not rely on
the security of his hotel suite but, rather, the misplaced confidence in a third party. Id.
46. United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699–700 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 1985);
and United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1975)).
47. See infra notes 52–86 and accompanying text (discussing cases that hold this as the law). R
48. United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992).
49. United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988).
50. United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1986).
51. 480 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2007).
52. Id. at 748.
53. Id.
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age facility.”54  Even after being confronted about a storage facility
receipt that was found in his wallet for the storage facility, the defen-
dant “vehemently denied” ownership.55  The defendant stated: “I
don’t have a unit over there.  You can search any of them over there.
You are not going to find anything.”56  The court reasoned that “Dil-
ley maintained the expectation of privacy in his storage unit even after
denying his ownership, then he exercised his property rights by con-
senting to a search of the location.”57
Likewise, Fourth Amendment protection for communication is
maintained even when the communication can be tapped into with
little effort.  In United States v. Smith,58 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit addressed whether warrantless tapping of cordless
phones is permissible.59  A neighbor suspected the defendant of being
involved with break-ins at the neighbor’s house.60  The neighbor
eavesdropped on the defendant’s cordless telephone calls and discov-
ered that the defendant was a drug dealer.61  Then, the neighbor con-
tacted a friend at the police department and was instructed to record
the calls.62  The court acknowledged prior cases that held that defend-
ants who used cordless phones had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, but ultimately the court held that “these cases should not be
read to stand for the proposition that a communication loses Fourth
Amendment protection simply because it is not transmitted by wire.
There is nothing magical about a telephone line.”63  The court rea-
soned that just because someone may eavesdrop on a conversation





57. Dilley, 480 F.3d at 750.  The court distinguished Dilley from United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d
789 (5th Cir. 2000), in which the defendant denied residing at a particular house.  Id. (citing
Vega, 221 F.3d at 797).  The court in Dilley emphasized that refusal to give incriminating answers
is not a waiver of the expectation of privacy in a residence. Id.
58. 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 179–80.
60. Id. at 173.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 179.
64. Smith, 978 F.2d at 180–81 (“No matter how technologically advanced cordless communica-
tion becomes, some people will always find a way to eavesdrop on their neighbors.  However,
‘[t]he fact that [Listening] Toms abound does not license the government to follow suit.’” (alter-
ations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D.
Haw. 1976))).
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Although the court “express[ed] no opinion as to what features or
circumstances would be necessary to give rise to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, it should be obvious that as technological advances
make cordless communications more private, such communication
will be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”65  The court also
advised against judicial intervention.66  In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Marshall stated: “Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed
absolutely or not at all.  Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or
phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that
this information will be released to other persons for other
purposes.”67
Similar to the inquisitive neighbor, ISPs can eavesdrop on e-mails.
Steven Warshak, owner of Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals,68
brought a civil case “to stop the government’s repeated secret
searches and seizures of his stored e-mail using the SCA.”69  A panel
of the circuit judges found “little difficulty agreeing with the district
court that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in
e-mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial
[ISPs].”70  This often-cited opinion was vacated en banc for ripeness,
but, as discussed infra, in Warshak’s criminal appeal, the court essen-
tially agreed with the vacated opinion and recognized Fourth Amend-
ment protection for e-mails.71
Drawing from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Katz, in War-
shak v. United States, the court held that the “content of e-mail is
something that the user ‘seeks to preserve as private’ and therefore
‘may be constitutionally protected.’”72  The court stated that “like the
telephone earlier in our history, e-mail is an ever-increasing mode of
private communication, and protecting shared communications
65. Id. at 180.
66. Id. at 181 (“Granted, it would be easier to apply a general rule that it either is or is not
reasonable to expect privacy for cordless telephone communications. The creation of such a
general rule, however, is beyond the proper role of the judiciary.”).
67. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Perhaps most famous—outside of electronic discovery circles—for its “Smiling Bob” com-
mercials. See Dan Slater, Fraudulent Male Enhancement Drug Gets Company Founder 25 Yrs.,
WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Aug. 27, 2008, 3:43 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/08/27/fraudulent-
male-enhancement-drug-gets-company-founder-25-yrs/.
69. Court Protects E-mail from Secret Government Searches, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(June 18, 2007), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/06/court-protects-email-secret-government-
searches (citing Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, Oct. 9, 2007).
70. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 473.
71. See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. R
72. Id. at 473 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
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through this medium is as important to Fourth Amendment principles
today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past.”73
In Warshak, the government argued that expectations of privacy are
waived because service providers screen e-mails for illegal and mali-
cious content.74  The court analogized this screening process to a “post
office screening packages for evidence of drugs or explosives, which
does not expose the content of written documents enclosed in the
packages.”75  The court also held that “[t]he fact that such screening
occurs as a general matter does not diminish the well-established rea-
sonable expectation of privacy that users of the mail maintain in the
packages they send.”76
Even in government-operated servers, military personnel maintain
a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy in e-mails.  In United
States v. Long,77 the court took a banner about monitoring, which was
displayed at the computer’s login prompt, as describing “access to
‘monitor’ the computer system, not to engage in law enforcement in-
trusions by examining the contents of particular e-mails in a manner
unrelated to maintenance of the e-mail system.”78  The court in Long
emphasized that the defendant’s possession of a password known only
to her supported “a subjective expectation that access to her e-mails
was protected and severely limited.”79
In United States v. Mourning,80 the court recognized a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a locked strongbox that multiple people had
access to through a shared studio.81  “It is perfectly reasonable to rec-
ognize an expectation of privacy in a hidden, locked safe or strong
box, despite the fact that more than one person, and as many as ten,
had keys or access to the studio.”82  The court reasoned, in part, that
“enclosed spaces” represented places with the highest expectations of
privacy.83
In fact, an expectation of privacy may be maintained even when
information is voluntarily shared with a third party.  In her concurring
opinion in United States v. Jones,84 Justice Sotomayor wrote that “it
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 474.
76. Id.
77. 64 M.J. 57 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
78. Id. at 63.
79. Id.
80. 716 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
81. Id. at 279, 291–92.
82. Id. at 292.
83. Id. (quoting United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 1978)).
84. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties.”85  Justice Sotomayor recognized the chasm between
the traditional third-party doctrine and the way people use technology
now, writing:
[The] approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . .  But whatever the societal
expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy.  I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.86
Many types of storage and communication are protected by the
Fourth Amendment.  However, stored communication, such as e-mail,
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  The SCA mimics some
aspects of Fourth Amendment protection for stored communications.
B. Current SCA Protection for Consumer Data Stored with Service
Providers
The SCA was enacted to provide some Fourth Amendment-like
protection for information disclosed to service providers;87 however,
advances in technology have made the applicability of the SCA uncer-
tain and imprecise.  Congress enacted the SCA to protect certain
types of network communications, “freezing into the law the under-
standings of computer network use as of 1986.”88  When the SCA was
enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in
1986, “most people couldn’t imagine that online data storage would
approach the point where it was so inexpensive people would leave
their data online, so it was assumed that email left in networked stor-
85. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
86. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
87. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1212 (“The SCA . . . [offers] network account holders a range of R
statutory privacy rights against access to stored account information held by network service
providers.  The statute creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections by statute,
regulating the relationship between government investigators and service providers in possession
of users’ private information.”).
88. See id. at 1214.  As a point of reference, the SCA was enacted approximately ten years
before Google began as a research project of two Ph.D. students at Stanford University. Our
History in Depth, GOOGLE CO., https://www.google.com/about/company/history/.
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age over 180 days could be considered abandoned—like garbage on
the curb.”89
The SCA defines two types of providers, “providers of electronic
communication service (ECS) and providers of remote computing ser-
vice (RCS)”—a distinction from the age of time-sharing and main-
frames.90  Section 2703(a) of the SCA provides that “[a] governmental
entity may require the disclosure by [an ECS] provider of the contents
of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in
an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days
or less, only pursuant to a [probable cause] warrant.”91  Section
2703(a) also provides that a government entity may require the disclo-
sure of information “that has been in electronic storage in an elec-
tronic communications system for more than one hundred and eighty
days by the means available under subsection (b).”  Section 2703(b),
which also governs how a government entity can require disclosure by
a RCS provider regardless of the amount of time the information has
been stored, provides that a government entity may require disclosure
“without required notice to the subscriber or customer” with a proba-
ble cause warrant, or “with prior notice . . . to the subscriber if the
government entity uses an administrative subpoena,”92 or “obtains a
court order” that shall be issued “if the governmental entity offers
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents . . . are relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation.”93  In short, for any information
stored with a RCS provider, or information stored with an ECS pro-
vider for more than 180 days, the government entity need not show
probable cause but can obtain the information with notice to the cus-
tomer and either an administrative subpoena or a court order issued
under the lower “reasonable grounds” standard.94
In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that “a subscriber
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails
‘that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP’”
and that warrantless searches are unconstitutional.95  In 2010, the
89. Andrea Peterson, The Government Can (Still) Read Most of Your E-mails Without a War-
rant, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 20, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/03/20/174
2871/leahy-ecpa-reform-email/.
90. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1214.
91. Id. §2703(a) (emphasis added).
92. Id. §2703(b) (emphasis added).
93. Id. §2703(d) (emphasis added).
94. Id. §2703 (a)–(d).
95. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Warshak v. United
States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, Oct. 9, 2007).
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same parties from Warshak presented the same issue in a criminal
appeal, and “[t]he court again held that the government violated War-
shak’s Fourth Amendment rights by compelling [the service provid-
ers] to turn over the contents of his private e-mails.”96  The Sixth
Circuit analogized rental spaces, in which “an ‘expectation [of privacy]
persists, regardless of the incursions of handymen to fix leaky faucets.’
Therefore, some routine access to stored e-mail to audit, inspect, or
monitor is not enough to break the expectation of privacy.”97  Fur-
thermore, “[t]he Sixth Circuit held that an e-mail account holder has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of stored e-mail,
[and declared a provision of the SCA] unconstitutional because it per-
mits the issuance of a search warrant upon a standard short of proba-
ble cause.”98  Among the many decisions recognizing the holding in
Warshak, a D.C. district court held that “to the extent the SCA allows
access to e-mails without a warrant, it is unconstitutional” and ob-
served that the limits of the SCA are not clear.99
To further complicate the analysis, sometimes it is not even clear
whether the information sought is the consumer’s data or a provider’s
business record.  In In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data,100
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that historical cell
site data, which reveals the subscriber’s location history, is a business
record; thus, warrantless searches of that information are not per se
unconstitutional.101  However, in United States v. Davis,102 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that “cell site location
information is within the subscriber’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.  The obtaining of that data without a warrant is a Fourth
Amendment violation.”103
This uncertainty over whether ESI is protected by the SCA, or even
whether the SCA applies in a specific instance, is due, in part, to the
fact that “[t]he SCA is not a catch-all statute designed to protect the
privacy of stored Internet communications; instead it is narrowly tai-
lored to provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like protections for com-
96. Spencer S. Cady, Note, Reconciling Privacy with Progress: Fourth Amendment Protection
of E-Mail Stored with and Sent Through a Third-Party Internet Service Provider, 61 DRAKE L.
REV. 225, 245 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282).
97. Id. at 246 (footnote omitted) (quoting Warshak, 631 F.3d at 287).
98. Id. (citing Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288).
99. Id.
100. 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
101. Id. at 604.
102. 754 F.3d 1205, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014)
(mem.).
103. Id. at 1217.
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puter networks.”104  Since the enactment of the SCA in 1986, the
Internet has become an indispensable part of everyday life.
On November 10, 2014, President Obama made a statement urging
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “reclassify con-
sumer broadband service under Title II of the Telecommunications
Act” to protect net neutrality.105  In the accompanying video, Presi-
dent Obama asked the FCC “to recognize that for most Americans,
the Internet has become an essential part of everyday communication
and everyday life.”106  On February 26, 2015, the FCC adopted the
“Open Internet Rules” designed to ensure net neutrality; the rules
went into effect on June 12, 2015.107
Cloud computing has developed, in part, to cope with the increased
demand on service providers as a result of our increased reliance on
the Internet, and strong encryption has garnered public attention.
C. “Cloud” Computing and Strong Encryption
The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) defines
cloud computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services)
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal manage-
ment effort or service provider interaction.”108  The term was popular-
ized when Amazon announced its Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
(Amazon EC2),109 which is part of the Amazon Web Services (AWS)
infrastructure that provides computing resources for organizations
104. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1214. R
105. Statement on Internet Neutrality, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. DCPD201400841 (Nov.
10, 2014). The FCC announced the adoption of the proposed changes on February 26, 2015, and
it noted that “the nature of broadband Internet access service has . . . changed since [its] initial
classification.”  Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules
To Protect the Open Internet (Feb. 26, 2015).  Net neutrality is the principle that ISPs should not
“discriminate” legitimate traffic by blocking, throttling, or utilizing paid prioritization of traffic.
Id.  ISPs therefore, cannot interfere with traffic to the benefit of their affiliates or to the detri-
ment of their competitors. Id.
106. Joel Rose, Obama Backs Net Neutrality, Asks FCC To Regulate Internet, NPR, http://
www.npr.org/2014/11/10/363101482/obama-backs-net-neutrality-asks-fcc-to-regulate-internet
(last updated Nov. 10, 2014, 7:08 PM).
107. Open Internet, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
108. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 19, at 2. R
109. See Announcing Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) – beta, AMAZON WEB
SERVS. (Aug. 24, 2006), https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2006/08/24/announcing-
amazon-elastic-compute-cloud-amazon-ec2—-beta/.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL302.txt unknown Seq: 15 17-OCT-16 9:30
2016] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1107
and companies such as Netflix, Reddit, Yelp, Dow Jones, and the
CDC.110
Essential characteristics of the cloud, as defined by the NIST, in-
clude on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling,
rapid elasticity (to automatically scale service capabilities with de-
mand), and measured service (to provide monitoring of resources for
both maintenance and billing).111  These capabilities also allow ser-
vices, including those that enable mass adoption of strong encryption,
to deploy and rapidly respond to consumer demand with very little
friction.112
Cloud computing’s goal is to create an environment in which users
are not, and need not be, aware of the number, identity, location, or
capabilities of the individual resources that provide them with the
computing resources that they can utilize.113  The cloud actually pro-
vides opaqueness because “the cloud is merely an illusion.  You don’t
really get your applications or compute power from a ‘cloud’ some-
where—there are real physical servers and datacenters that supply
this capacity.”114  This leads to the common view among users that the
cloud is an abstract entity somewhere “out there.”  However, the
cloud, which is presented as a service, is actually powered by an infra-
structure composed of many real physical facilities called “data cen-
ters” that perform processing and host data.115
Cloud services are marketed, in part, for their security because con-
sumers expect their ESI to be well protected.116  Data centers are es-
sentially large complexes or warehouses that are home to an array of
server hardware.117  The data centers support and protect these serv-
110. See Steven Musil, Amazon Cloud Outage Downs Netflix, Quora, CNET (Aug. 8, 2011,
9:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-cloud-outage-downs-netflix-quora/; All AWS Cus-
tomer Stories, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/all/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2016).
111. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 19, at 2. R
112. See Saying Goodbye to Encrypted SMS/MMS, OPEN WHISPER SYS. (Mar. 6, 2015), https:/
/whispersystems.org/blog/goodbye-encrypted-sms/; Telegram FAQ, TELEGRAM, https://tele-
gram.org/faq (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
113. See Sean Rhea et al., Maintenance-Free Global Data Storage, IEEE INTERNET COMPUT-
ING, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 40, 40–41, 48, http://www.srhea.net/papers/ieeeic.pdf.
114. Joe McKendrick, Needed More than Ever: DevOps To Manage Cloud Unpredictability,
ZDNET (June 23, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/needed-more-than-ever-devops-
to-manage-cloud-unpredictability/.
115. See KAPIL BAKSHI, CISCO SYS., INC., CISCO CLOUD COMPUTING - DATA CENTER STRAT-
EGY, ARCHITECTURE, AND SOLUTIONS 3–4 (1st ed. 2009), http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/so-
lutions/industries/docs/gov/CiscoCloudComputing_WP.pdf.
116. See, e.g., Cloud Services, IRON MOUNTAIN, http://www.ironmountain.com/Services/Data-
Management/Cloud-Backup-Services.aspx (lasted visited Apr. 3, 2016).
117. BAKSHI, supra note 115, at 15.
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ers with redundant utilities, concrete walls “lined with Kevlar” for ex-
tra protection, limited windows, check points with guards who “use
mirrors to check underneath vehicles for explosives,” and HVAC sys-
tems that protect people and equipment from biological and chemical
attack, as well as smoke from nearby fires.118  Access to these facilities
is controlled by biometric identification and mantraps as well as layers
of security—part of a strategy of “defense in depth.”119  To enter a
data center and access a specific server, a visitor must often satisfy the
highest standards in multifactor authentication.120  The three pillars of
multifactor authentication are: “something I have, something I am,
and something I know.”121  Even for a data center hosting multiple
independent users, this authentication often means a badge, a biomet-
ric feature, and a PIN.122
Although the data in the datacenters is well protected from unau-
thorized access, service providers can, and do, scan traffic and “read”
e-mails.123  However, the process is accomplished by automated sys-
tems that try to, for example, identify spam and mine for data in e-
mails that are of interest to advertisers.124
Service providers also use hash functions to identify child pornogra-
phy and other illegal materials.125  Hash functions are one-way func-
tions that process data to produce a condensed representation called a
118. Sarah D. Scalet, 19 Ways To Build Physical Security into a Data Center, CIO (Mar. 8,
2006, 4:06 PM), http://www.cio.com.au/article/181324/19_ways_build_physical_security_into
_data_centre/; see SANS INST. READING ROOM, REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DESIGN OF A SECURE
DATA CENTER (2002) [hereinafter SANS INST. WHITE PAPERS], https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/recovery/requirements-design-secure-data-center-561;
119. See NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, DEFENSE IN DEPTH, https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/
support/defenseindepth.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2016); Chad Perrin, Understanding Layered Se-
curity and Defense in Depth, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 18, 2008, 6:05 AM), http://
www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/understanding-layered-security-and-defense-in-depth/.
120. See Understanding Security in the Virtualized IT Data Center, JUNIPER NETWORKS, http://
www.juniper.net/techpubs/en_US/release-independent/solutions/topics/concept/security-virtual-
it-dc-overview.html (last modified May 18, 2015).
121. Security Now!: Listener Feedback 217 (Gibson Research Corporation podcast Aug. 25,
2015) (transcript at 16), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-522.pdf.
122. Id. (“[F]or me to get to my servers at Level 3 I have a coded inductive badge, which I
have to present to a reader.  My right hand is biometrically measured, so there’s biometrics.  I
have to enter a PIN.  So I’ve got something I have, something I am, and something I know.  And
that gets me into the front door.  Then there’s conspicuous cameras everywhere, and I have to
use a combination lock in order to access my servers.”).
123. See Jack Schofield, Is Gmail Secure Enough for My Private E-mails?, GUARDIAN (Aug.
15, 2013, 10:39 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2013/aug/15/gmail-
google-email-privacy.
124. Id.
125. Sean Gallagher, Updated: How Verizon Found Child Pornography in Its Cloud, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 5, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php
?f=2&t=1196577&start=80; Lisa Vaas, Microsoft Scans E-mail for Child Abuse Images, Leads to
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hash value.  In the context of cryptography, the data is called the mes-
sage, while the hash value is called the message digest.126  Hash func-
tions are essentially mathematical functions used to “fingerprint” files
without actually examining the file in the traditional sense.127  Just like
fingerprints cannot be used to identify a suspect unless the suspect’s
fingerprint is already in a database, the examiner is not able to discern
anything about the content of the file without an independent record
that generates an identical hash.128  The message digest does not re-
veal any information about the file other than that it matches the mes-
sage digest of an identical file if the examiner has an independent
record of that identical file.129
Hash functions share this characteristic with fingerprints, and they
are therefore useful in this manner because of the “extremely low
probability that two different . . . messages will yield the same hash
value.”130  Any small change in the data will, “with a very high
probability, result in a different message digest.”131  For example,
“The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog” generates the Secure
Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) message digest of: “0x 2fd4 e1c6 7a2d 28fc
ed84 9ee1 bb76 e739 1b93 eb12,” whereas “the quick brown fox jumps
over the lazy dog” (with a lowercase t) generates the message digest
Arrest, NAKED SECURITY (SOPHOS) (Aug. 10, 2014), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/08/
10/microsoft-scans-email-for-child-porn-images-leads-to-arrest%E2%80%8F/.
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUB 180-4,
SECURE HASH STANDARD (SHS), at iv (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter SHS REPORT], http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf.
127. Greg Kumparak, How Dropbox Knows When You’re Sharing Copyrighted Stuff (Without
Actually Looking at Your Stuff), TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 30, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/
30/how-dropbox-knows-when-youre-sharing-copyrighted-stuff-without-actually-looking-at-your-
stuff/.
128. Similar to fingerprints, the message digest itself, generated by a hash function, does not
identify the file without an independent record of the file. Id. (“It might help to think of a hash
like a fingerprint.  Everyone’s fingerprint is unique, but it can’t be used to identify a person
unless you already have a record of that person’s fingerprint to compare it to.”).
129. Id.
130. Stephen Northcutt, Hash Functions, SANS TECH. INST.,  http://www.sans.edu/research/
security-laboratory/article/hash-functions (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
131. SHS REPORT, supra note 126, at 3.  Efforts are always underway to stay ahead of increas- R
ing computational power to generate collisions or predictably generating files with different con-
tent but the same signature. See, e.g., MSRC Team, Microsoft Releases Security Advisory
2718704, TECHNET BLOG: MICROSOFT SECURITY RESPONSE CTR (June 3, 2012, 5:41 PM), https://
blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2012/06/03/microsoft-releases-security-advisory-2718704/; see
also When Will We See Collisions for SHA-1?, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Oct. 5, 2012, 1:24 PM),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_se.html (reporting on estimates
of when a practical collision attack will be developed; a collision attack is an attempt to predict-
ably find two different messages that generate the same message digest).  And, the information
security industry continues to deprecate, or replace, older standards. See Bruce Morton, SHA-1
Deprecation, on to SHA-2, ENTRUST IDENTITYON: BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013), https://
www.entrust.com/sha-1-deprecation-on-to-sha-2/.
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of: “0x 1631 2751 ef93 07c3 fd1a fbcb 993c dc80 464b a0f1.”132  “No
other file will have the same hash value . . . , except a file that is
identical, bit-for-bit.  If one altered [the file] by changing so little as
one bit, the hash value of [the file] would be different as well.”133  A
hash function message digest alone can identify the file, but cannot be
used to recreate what is in the file.134
Due to the disconnect between the technical and legal protections,
and in the wake of the Snowden revelations of government mass sur-
veillance activities, consumers have demanded more information se-
curity protections,135 and the information technology industry
responded by enabling encryption by default in more services.136
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo all have implemented plans for e-mail
encryption in transit.137  However, this does not protect the message
from being read by the service providers themselves.  Service provid-
ers do sometimes “read” consumers’ e-mails, for example, in response
to court orders or to investigate internal leaks of intellectual property
and trade secrets.138  However, many service providers deploy strong
encryption that makes it impossible, even for the service providers, to
decrypt the encrypted information.139
“Encryption converts data to an unintelligible form called
ciphertext; decrypting the ciphertext converts the data back into its
132. See WOLFRAM ALPHA, https://www.wolframalpha.com (enter “SHA ‘The quick brown
fox jumps over the lazy dog,’” and “SHA ‘the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog’”) (last
visited Feb. 2, 2016).
133. Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 HARV. L.
REV. F. 38, 39 (2006).
134. Id. at 42.  A properly designed hashing algorithm for computer forensics purposes exhibit
two important properties. Id. at 39.  “First, the hash value will be, for all practical purposes,
uniquely associated with the input.” Id.  The probability that two different inputs will result in
the same output, or “collide,” must be astronomically small. Id.  Second, the algorithm must be
a “one-way function”; that is, “[o]ne can calculate a hash value from input, but cannot derive the
input from the hash value.” Id. at 40.
135. The revelations triggered a “growing public concern for privacy,” and the public adopted
techniques to “shield their movements online.”  Lauren C. Williams, More People Are Encrypt-
ing Their Web Traffic in the Wake of NSA Spying Revelations, THINKPROGRESS (May 17, 2014,
1:02 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/05/17/3438919/more-people-turn-to-encryption-af-
ter-snowden-leaks/.
136. See Amit Chowdhry, Microsoft Opens Transparency Center and Enhances Encryption for




138. Zach Miners, Worried About the Government? Internet Giants Also Dip Their Hands in
the Cookie Jar, PCWORLD (Mar. 21, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2110900/
worried-about-the-government-internet-giants-also-dip-their-hands-in-the-cookie-jar.html.
139. See Secure Messaging Scorecard, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/se-
cure-messaging-scorecard (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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original form, called plaintext.”140  For example, in Apple’s iMessage
implementation, “[y]ou send a text message that’s encrypted on your
device.  It passes through Apple servers as jumbled code nobody can
crack.  And it can only get decrypted by your friend’s [device].”141
Apple and Google have announced plans to encrypt text messages by
default.142  This led FBI Director James Comey to opine that the tech-
nology is beyond law enforcement’s capabilities to bypass in an emer-
gency.143  Encryption is designed to make it computationally difficult
to derive the original plaintext from the resulting ciphertext without
the correct encryption key.144  For example, the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), selected by NIST in 2001, puts the plaintext through
rounds of the algorithm with each round being dependent on the pre-
vious round, resulting in ciphertext that is computationally infeasible
to revert to the plaintext.145
Encryption is a powerful tool in cryptography that cannot be easily
bypassed.146  For example, assuming there is no unknown built-in
weakness or backdoors, “a brute-force attack on a message encrypted
with 256-bit AES would take even a supercomputer longer to break
than the universe has been in existence.”147  Although the specific im-
plementations can have weaknesses and theoretical attacks exist, the
140. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUB 197, AD-
VANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), at i (Nov. 26, 2011) [hereinafter AES REPORT], http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.
141. Jose Pagliery, FBI Director: iPhones Shields Pedophiles from Cops, CNN MONEY (Oct.
14, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/13/technology/security/fbi-apple/.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. AES REPORT, supra note 140, at i. R
145. Id. See generally What Is Encryption?, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, https://ssd.eff.org/
en/module/what-encryption (last updated Nov. 3, 2014) (providing more information regarding
encryption).  Although the terms used to describe cryptographic schemes employ the suffix of
“text” (e.g., ciphertext and plaintext), the techniques are applicable to any data regardless of
whether the data represents an e-mail, a photograph, a document, a video, or a phone call be-
cause the encryption works on the underlying data and not what is displayed to the user. See
Daniel J. Sherwinter, Note, Surveillance’s Slippery Slope: Using Encryption To Recapture Pri-
vacy Rights, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 501, 513–14 (2007).  See CAREY PARKER,
FIREWALLS DON’T STOP DRAGONS: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO COMPUTER SECURITY FOR NON-
TECHIES 39–49 (2015), for a brief history of cryptography.
146. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Has the NSA Broken SSL? TLS? AES?, ZDNET (Sept. 6,
2013,  1:17 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/has-the-nsa-broken-ssl-tls-aes/.
147. Id.  Mohit Arora, How Secure Is AES Against Brute Force Attacks?, EE TIMES (May 7,
2012, 05:29 PM),  http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1279619 (“The key length used
in the encryption determines the practical feasibility of performing a brute-force attack, with
longer keys exponentially more difficult to crack than shorter ones.  Brute-force attack involves
systematically checking all possible key combinations until the correct key is found and is one
way to attack when it is not possible to take advantage of other weaknesses in an encryption
system.”).
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underlying cryptography is sound; thus, encrypted data cannot be
decrypted without the encryption key.148  This is commonly called
“strong encryption.”
Although encryption does not always make it impossible for law
enforcement or intelligence agencies to access someone’s data, en-
cryption does make it much more difficult and time consuming to do
so.149  In fact, it is practically impossible to do this if the one who
holds the encryption key (assuming it is a strong key) does not coop-
erate.150  If information is encrypted, law enforcement can no longer
access the information “secretly by going to Apple or Google.”151  In-
stead, law enforcement “must knock on your front door with a war-
rant in hand” in the same way that other searches of information that
is protected are conducted pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.152
For example, “if you don’t give the FBI access to your phone, it can
ask a federal judge to force you.  If you refuse, the government can
throw you in jail and hold you in contempt of court.”153  However, if
the encryption key is not divulged, it is practically impossible to access
that information.154
Courts are currently divided on whether defendants can be com-
pelled by a court order to divulge the encryption key without violating
the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.155  These uncertainties fur-
ther complicate the analysis under both the Fourth Amendment and
the SCA.  The U.S. Supreme Court recognized these complications in
Riley.156
148. Jennifer Seberry, World’s Toughest Encryption Scheme Found ‘Vulnerable,’ PHYS.ORG
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://phys.org/news/2011-08-world-toughest-encryption-scheme-vulnera-
ble.html (“Academics say an algorithm is ‘broken’ if it has a ‘certification weakness.’ Simply, an
encryption implementation is said to have a certification weakness if the content of the en-
crypted message can be read in less time than it would take to try every possible key.”)  This
does not mean that the algorithm is no longer safe to use.  Rather, “plenty of further study is
needed before we are even close to thinking AES implementations are insecure.” Id.






155. See, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06–MJ–91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009)
(reasoning that because the government knew of the existence and location of the files, provid-
ing the government access to the unencrypted form of those files added nothing to the govern-
ment’s information). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670
F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that compelling the defendant to decrypt the drives
would be testimonial and violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination).
156. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
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D. Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court Recognizes the
Blurred Line Between Local and Remote Storage
In Riley the U.S. Supreme Court refused to allow warrantless
searches of cell phones incident to arrest.157  These searches could
have been a simple extension of the Fourth Amendment exception
long enjoyed by law enforcement incident to arrest, but the Court
drew the line at cell phones.158  However, Riley “does not address the
broader question of whether information stored in the cloud is enti-
tled to Fourth Amendment protection in other contexts.”159
The Court recognized complications brought by the complex inter-
actions of mobile devices and the expansiveness of, and social reliance
on, data stored in the cloud, noting:
Treating a cell phone as a container whose contents may be
searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter.
But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to ac-
cess data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.  That is what cell
phones, with increasing frequency, are designed to do by taking ad-
vantage of “cloud computing.” Cloud computing is the capacity of
Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers
rather than on the device itself.  Cell phone users often may not
know whether particular information is stored on the device or in
the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.160
Riley did not “address[ ] how the third-party doctrine applies to dig-
ital data,” that is, whether the consumer waives Fourth Amendment
protection by giving the information to a service provider.161  There-
fore, Riley did “little to clarify how the third-party doctrine applies to
information stored in the cloud in other contexts, leaving open the
question of whether police can acquire cloud-based information from
third parties who host the cloud servers.”162  However, Riley showed
the Court’s recognition of the difficulties that both the consumer and
the courts face in assessing information that enjoys a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in ESI.  These difficulties are the result of the
disconnect between the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
SCA protection, the state of information technology, and consumer
expectations.
157. Id. at 2494–95; Andrew Pincus, Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment: The
Implications of Riley v. California, 2013–2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 308.
158. Pincus, supra note 157, at 308.
159. Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud, 124
YALE L.J. F. 73, 73 (2014).
160. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (citation omitted).
161. Watzel, supra note 159, at 75. R
162. Id. at 76.
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III. ANALYSIS
Riley suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court is willing to extend
Fourth Amendment protection to the cloud, which is increasingly used
in the same way that local storage is used on hardware directly con-
trolled by consumers.163  The SCA is outdated and must be updated to
reflect modern expectations of privacy because electronic communica-
tion has been widely adopted and has become unavoidable in modern
society.164  In addition, information stored with a service provider
should not be considered “disclosed” to a third-party.165  Today, con-
sumers subjectively retain an expectation of privacy in their data
stored with a service provider.  If legal protection is not clarified to
alleviate consumer anxieties about mass surveillance and warrantless
searches, uncertainties surrounding Fourth Amendment protection of
consumer information will lead to mass adoption of encryption.  The
decades-old SCA no longer conforms to consumer expectations of pri-
vacy and the omnipresence of ESI; ESI should enjoy the same treat-
ment as the other forms of communication and the storage that it is
rapidly replacing.  This Comment presents three reasons why the SCA
is outdated.
First, it is now virtually impossible to conduct business without us-
ing e-mail or other electronic communication mediums and storing in-
formation with service providers.166  Consequently, consumers are
forced to expose their information to service providers.167  Second, the
differentiation between local and remote storage is blurring.168  Many
of the major service providers design their products and services to be
dependent on the “cloud” and to provide a seamless experience for
the consumer that purposely blurs local and remote resources.169  Fi-
nally, the average consumer does not often delete e-mails within 180
days.  In fact, many consumers never delete e-mails because the space
allocated by popular e-mail services far exceeds the space required by
163. Although the hardware is controlled by service providers, consumers store their informa-
tion on that hardware through cloud-based services.  Id. at 79.
164. See Press Release, Leahy, Lee Introduce Legislation To Update Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (Mar. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release, Leahy and Lee Introduce Legisla-
tion], https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-lee-introduce-legislation-to-update-electronic-
communications-privacy-act.
165. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 551
(2005).
166. See infra notes 171–88 (discussing normalities of stored communication).
167. See infra notes 171–88.
168. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014); see supra notes 157–62. R
169. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
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the average consumer.170  Therefore, Congress must amend the SCA
to recognize Fourth Amendment protection for ESI, eliminate the ar-
bitrary 180-day rule and distinction between storage and communica-
tion, uphold search warrant requirements despite the third-party
doctrine, and rebuild the trust between law enforcement and the peo-
ple of the United States.
A. Stored Communications Is Unavoidable in Everyday Life
Internet adoption has gone from 14% in 1995 to nearly 80% in
2009, and, in 2013, 98% of U.S. households had access to broadband
Internet.171  Companies that have utilized Amazon’s cloud service,
AWS, include Comcast, Novartis, Pfizer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Dow
Jones, and even government entities like the CDC, the FDA, and
NASA.172  Because the Internet is so important to everyday life, many
states offer low-cost, high-speed Internet access assistance to low-in-
come households, which include those on “Medicaid, Food Stamps,
SSI, home energy assistance or public housing assistance.”173  In fact,
Internet access for communication and information is so essential to
modern life that in 2012, “a federal court . . . struck down a Louisiana
statute that banned sex offenders from using social network websites
because the statutory definition of ‘social networking’ was overbroad,
potentially extending to cover ‘many commonly read news and infor-
mation websites.’”174
Telephone services traditionally enjoyed very high protections de-
spite the users arguably exposing conversations to the third-party ser-
vice providers.175  But, consumers are increasingly abandoning
170. Matt Warman, One in Ten ‘Never Delete E-mail,’ TELEGRAPH (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9144134/One-in-ten-never-delete-e-mail.html.
171. Edward Wyatt, Most of U.S. Is Wired, but Millions Aren’t Plugged In, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/technology/a-push-to-connect-millions-who-live-of-
fline-to-the-Internet.
172. All AWS Customer Stories, supra note 110. R
173. Jim T. Miller, How To Get Cheap or Free Internet Access at Home, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 2, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-t-miller/how-to-get-cheap-or-free-
_b_4368774.html.
174. Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of Facebook, 44
N.M. L. REV. 121, 160 n.193 (2014) (quoting Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (M.D. La.
2012)).
175. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (“These considerations do not
vanish when the search in question is transferred . . . to that of a telephone booth.  Wherever a
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.”). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently
has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information [she] voluntarily
turns over to third parties.”).  The information at issue in Smith was metadata—specifically call
records, not the contents of the conversation—as service provider business records. Id. at 743
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traditional telephone services in favor of services provided by ISPs,
and “[a]t current rates the last landline in America will be discon-
nected sometime in 2025.”176
Consumers are increasingly dependent on network storage.177  A
projected one-third of consumer digital content will be in the cloud by
2016.178  According to the Cisco Global Cloud Index: Forecast and
Methodology, 2014–2019, “global cloud IP traffic will reach 8.6 ZB
[per year] (719 EB per month) by the end of 2019, up from 2.1 ZB per
year (1176 EB per month) in 2014.”179  “Global cloud IP traffic will
account for more than four-fifths (83%) of total data center traffic by
2019.”180  In addition, “[b]y 2019, 55 percent (2 billion) of the con-
sumer Internet population will use personal cloud storage, up from 42
percent (1.1 billion users) in 2014.”  Further, “consumer cloud storage
traffic per user will be 1.6 Gigabytes per month by 2019, compared to
992 megabytes per month in 2014.”181  In other words, by 2019, the
majority of consumers will use some form of cloud storage, and the
vast majority of Internet traffic will be used to support the infrastruc-
ture making that possible.
Some legislators have recognized this issue, and “[Democratic] Sen-
ator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and [Republican] Senator Mike Lee (R-
UT) introduced a bipartisan bill . . .  to reform the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act (ECPA) that would grant new privacy protec-
tions for email and other cloud stored data.”182  Organizations have
also formed coalitions around this issue to ensure Fourth Amendment
(“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversa-
tion private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of
the number he dialed.”).
176. JULIE SIEBENS, U.S CENSUS BUREAU, P70-136, EXTENDED MEASURES OF WELL-BEING:
LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 11 (Sept. 2013), http://www.census.gov/
prod/2013pubs/p70-136.pdf (“Although landlines were nearly universal in 1998 at 96 percent, by
2011 the percentage of householders with a landline dropped to 71 percent.  During this same
time, the number of householders with access to only a landline (no cellular phone) dropped
much more.  Six out of 10 householders had a landline only in 1998, but by 2011 this proportion
fell to 1 out of 10.”); The Decline of the Landline: Unwired, ECONOMIST (Aug. 13, 2009), http://
www.economist.com/node/14213965.
177. See Peterson, supra note 89.  Information stored on remote servers is, therefore, far from R
“abandoned garbage on the curb” as envisioned by the original drafters of the SCA. See id.
178. Press Release, Gartner Says That Consumers Will Store More than a Third of Their
Digital Content in the Cloud by 2016 (June 25, 2012), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/
2060215.





182. Peterson, supra note 89. R
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protections for Internet communications; the coalitions include the
American Civil Liberties Union, Heritage Action for America, Amer-
icans for Tax Reform, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and
“[p]rivacy advocates, trade associations, think tanks, legal scholars,
start-ups, and major Internet and communications companies.”183
Senator Leahy, one of the authors of the original 1986 legislation,
sponsored the proposed amendment to the SCA184 and stressed: “No
one could have imagined just how the Internet and mobile technolo-
gies would transform how we communicate and exchange information
today.”185  Senator Leahy also stated:
“Privacy laws written in an analog era are no longer suited for pri-
vacy threats we face in a digital world.  Three decades later, we must
update this law to reflect new privacy concerns and new technologi-
cal realities, so that our Federal privacy laws keep pace with Ameri-
can innovation and the changing mission of our law enforcement
agencies.”186
In the midst of these uncertainties over legal protections, Ameri-
cans are increasingly interested in technological solutions that enable
them to take matters into their own hands; thus, the information se-
curity field has enthusiastically supplied both the knowledge and the
technology.  In the wake of the Snowden revelations, the Electronic
Frontiers Foundation (EFF) relaunched its “Surveillance Self-De-
fense” guide with the goal of “provid[ing] information on how to use
technology more safely,” including tutorials on how to encrypt devices
183. About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?
objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014); see also About Us,
DIGITAL 4TH (2016), http://www.digital4th.org/about-us.php.
184. A nearly identical bill, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of
2015, was introduced in 2015.  S. 356, 114th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Sept. 16, 2015);  Press Release, Leahy Joined by Bipartisan, Bicameral Group To Introduce Bill
Protecting Online Privacy (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-joined-by-bi-
partisan-bicameral-group-to-introduce-bill-protecting-online-privacy.  In April, 2016, the House
Judiciary Committee approved the similar Email Privacy Act; the bill is sponsored by 315 of the
435 representatives but is expected to land in a gridlocked Senate.  Dustin Volz, Long-Stalled
Email Privacy Bill Advances in Congress, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:25 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-cyber-emails-idUSKCN0XA1VK.
185. Press Release, Leahy and Lee Introduce Legislation, supra note 164 (quoting Sen. Pat-
rick Leahy).
186. Id. (quoting Sen. Mike Lee).  Senator Leahy explained: “At the time that Congress en-
acted ECPA . . ., Congress assumed that most Americans would periodically access their email
accounts and download any emails that they wished to read, and that third-party service provid-
ers would subsequently delete any email stored on their servers.” S. REP. NO. 113-34, at 2
(2013).  However, technological advances have changed the way that consumers access their e-
mails and other stored communications. Id.  Senator Leahy further stated: “The digital privacy
protections that the Congress put in place by enacting ECPA have not kept pace with these
changes.” Id.
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and communications.187  In fact, information security is so important
to modern consumers that a 2014 Gallup poll found that Americans
worry more often about being hacked than being murdered.188  As
these systems rapidly replace traditional forms of storage and commu-
nication, the legal protections for ESI need to reflect how consumers
actually view the relationship between themselves, their data, and
third parties like service providers.
B. Information Stored with, or Transported by, a Third Party Is
Not “Disclosed” to the Third Party
The third-party doctrine provides that Fourth Amendment protec-
tion is relinquished for information disclosed to a third party.189  Ser-
vice providers scan traffic, for example, to identify spam and mine
information for advertisers190 or use hash values (often simply called
hashes) to identify illegal materials by matching the hash values to
known illegal materials.191  However, Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence does not consider hash matching a search by a human exam-
iner; therefore hash matching should not constitute disclosure to a
third party.192  Hash matching is used to quickly and accurately ensure
that seized illegal materials match previously generated records of
identical illegal materials without the need for a human examiner.193
Automatic traffic scanning does not involve a human actually reading
the contents of the message; therefore, it should not implicate the
third-party doctrine or negate Fourth Amendment privacy expecta-
tions in electronic communications at all.
Hash matching is similar to the use of narcotics sniffing dogs, and
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the use of narcotics sniffing
187. Jillian York, EFF Relaunches Surveillance Self-Defense, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/eff-relaunches-surveillance-self-defense
(“In the time since the Snowden revelations, we’ve learned a lot about the threats faced by
individuals and organizations all over the world—threats to privacy, security, and free expres-
sion.  And there is still plenty that we don’t know.  In creating the new [Surveillance Self-De-
fense guide], we seek to help users of technology understand for themselves the threats they face
and use technology to fight back against them.  These resources are intended to inspire better-
informed conversations and decision-making about digital security in privacy, resulting in a
stronger uptake of best practices, and the spread of vital awareness among our many
constituents.”).
188. Rebecca Riffkin, Hacking Tops List of Crimes Americans Worry About Most, GALLUP
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178856/hacking-tops-list-crimes-americans-
worry.aspx.
189. Kerr, supra note 7, at 563. R
190. Schofield, supra note 123. R
191. Gallagher, supra note 125; Vaas, supra note 125. R
192. See Salgado, supra note 133, at 42–43. R
193. See id. at 43.
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dogs is not a search because only contraband would generate a hit.194
“The analogous argument for hashing runs as follows: there is no legit-
imate expectation of privacy in the possession of contraband; govern-
ment conduct that reveals only the presence of contraband
compromises no legitimate interests; a hash value search will only re-
veal the presence or absence of child pornography files.”195  In addi-
tion, as discussed supra, hash matching is inherently different from
directly reading the materials because the examiner can only identify
a match if he has an independent record of the original.196
Some commentators have argued that a hash is not analogous to a
narcotics sniffing dog because the information is exposed to the gov-
ernment during processing.197  However, this argument is based on the
premise that the processing of the files is a search.198  “[A] search oc-
curs when information from or about the data is exposed to possible
human observation, such as when it appears on a screen, rather than
when it is copied by the hard drive or processed by the computer.”199
In In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled &
Maintained by Microsoft Corp.,200 a U.S. district court held that a war-
194. Alexandra L. Mitter, Deputizing Internet Service Providers: How the Government Avoids
Fourth Amendment Protections, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 235, 259–60 (2011) (discussing
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
“[The Court] held that narcotics-sniffing dogs could be used without implicating the Fourth
Amendment, because the dogs can only detect the presence or absence of contraband.” Id.
195. Id. at 259.
196. See supra notes 125–38 and accompanying text. R
197. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 165, at 547–48 (“[R]ules for looking through a computer R
should be governed by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions on searches, and specifically by
what I term an ‘exposure-based approach’ to searches.  Under this approach, a search of data
stored on a hard drive occurs when that data, or information about that data, is exposed to
human observation.  Any observable retrieval of information stored on a computer hard drive,
no matter how minor, should be considered a distinct Fourth Amendment search.”);  Mitter,
supra note 194, at 260 (“While, like a drug-sniffing dog, child pornography hash values are de- R
signed to detect only contraband, the manner in which searches of Internet activity are carried
out is fundamentally different.  In running a hash, private electronic files must be opened, ac-
cessed, and copied, unlike a dog sniff that can permeate a closed suitcase or car trunk. . . .  While
hashing is designed to reveal only contraband files, the investigator running the hash program,
unlike a trained canine, must copy and access each file in order to derive its unique hash value,
even those in which a reasonable expectation of privacy remains, a process that could potentially
reveal information about non-contraband files.” (footnotes omitted)).
198. Mitter, supra note 194, at 260. R
199. Kerr, supra note 165, at 551. R
200. 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) rev’d, No. 14-2985, 2016 WL3770056 (2d Cir. July 14,
2016) [hereinafter Warrant To Search Microsoft E-mail Accounts].  The Second Circuit noted
that “[t]here decades ago, international boundaries were not so routinely crossed as they are
today, when service providers rely on worldwide networks of hardware to satisfy users’ 21st-
century demands for access and speed and their related, evolving expectations of privacy.” Id. at
6.  Concurring in a seperate opinion, Judge Gerard E. Lynch emphasized the need for Congress
to amend the “badly outdated” SCA. Id. (Lynch, J., concurring).
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rant to search data stored in Microsoft’s data centers in Ireland
through Microsoft’s Global Criminal Compliance Department located
in the United States did “not implicate principles of extraterritorial-
ity” because “no such exposure takes place until the information is
reviewed in the United States, and, consequently, no extraterritorial
search has occurred.”201  Therefore, the data stored with a third party
is not exposed to that third party if the information is automatically
processed by a computer.202  However, none of these techniques will
work to identify illegal materials protected by strong encryption.203
If Congress enacts clear legal protections for ESI that adhere to the
consumers’ expectations of privacy despite the third-party doctrine,
consumers will be less likely to adopt strong encryption and less con-
cerned about trusting domestic companies with their data.  Further,
law enforcement will maintain access to the information they need in
emergencies.
C. The SCA Does Not Conform to Modern Expectations of
Privacy
The decades-old SCA no longer conforms to modern expectations
of privacy because consumers do not use service provider controlled
hardware in the same manner as they did when the SCA was enacted.
Service providers control the hardware and services that store con-
sumer data and regularly analyze that data with automated
processes.204  Nevertheless, consumers who are aware of what service
providers do with their data believe that they have an expectation of
privacy in that data.205  In an opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal,
Brad Smith, General Counsel and Executive Vice President for legal
201. Id. at 472.
202. See Kumparak, supra note 127. R
203. Encryption obfuscates plaintext into ciphertext.  Without breaking open the encryption,
an eavesdropper is unable to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext. See generally Inspection
of SSL Traffic Overview, JUNIPER NETWORKS (Jan. 12, 2010), https://www.juniper.net/techpubs/
en_US/idp5.0/topics/concept/intrusion-detection-prevention-ssl-decryption-overview.html
(describing the cryptographic protocol).  A hash value calculated from the ciphertext would be
different from a hash value calculated from the plaintext.  The same plaintext will generate dif-
ferent ciphertexts if the keys are different. See Generating a Key from a Password, MICROSOFT
DEVELOPER: .NET SECURITY BLOG (Apr. 14, 2004), https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/shawnfa/
2004/04/14/generating-a-key-from-a-password/.  Even two users who use the same password will
almost always have different keys because a properly designed cryptosystem does not simply use
the password as the key, but derives a key from the password by incorporating a salt, iteration
count, and other sources of entropy. See id.  By design, encryption makes it computationally
infeasible to obtain any information from the ciphertext without the key.
204. See, e.g., Kumparak, supra note 127.
205. Brad Smith, We’re Fighting the Feds over Your E-mail, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2014, http://
online.wsj.com/articles/brad-smith-were-fighting-the-feds-over-your-email-1406674616.
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and corporate affairs at Microsoft, stated that Microsoft is fighting the
ruling in Warrant To Search Microsoft E-mail Accounts. 206  Smith fur-
ther stated that Microsoft believes their consumers “own emails
stored in the cloud, and that they have the same privacy protection as
paper letters sent by mail.  This means . . . that the U.S. government
can obtain emails only subject to the full legal protections of the Con-
stitution’s Fourth Amendment.”207  Microsoft commissioned a survey
that found “86% [of American voters] believe police should have to
follow the same legal requirements for obtaining personal information
stored in the cloud as they do for personal information stored on
paper.”208
At least “28 media and technology companies, 23 trade associations,
and 35 computer scientists signed on to amicus briefs supporting
[Microsoft’s] court case.”209  Smith also discussed court cases recog-
nizing the need for a warrant to search shipping packages, safe deposit
boxes, hotel room drawers, and to listen in on telephone calls.210
“Courts have long recognized the distinction between a company’s
business records and an individual’s personal communications.”211
The distinction is between the information the business must use to
provide services to the consumer and “what a consumer put inside”
those services.212  For example, information that shows where a cus-
tomer shipped packages is generally considered a business record be-
cause the customer expects that the shipping company needs that
information to deliver the package.213  However, the contents of that
package are protected, and, generally, the government must “establish
probable cause and get a warrant” to look inside the package.214
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Brad Smith, Digital Common Sense: New Survey Shows Americans Want a Better Privacy
Balance, DIGITAL CONSTITUTION: BLOG (July 16, 2014), http://digitalconstitution.com/2014/07/
digital-common-sense-new-survey-shows-americans-want-better-privacy-balance/.
209. Matt Day, Amazon, HP, eBay Join Microsoft Bandwagon in Warrant Case, SEATTLE
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/microsoftpri0/2014/12/15/amazon-
hp-ebay-join-microsoft-bandwagon-in-warrant-case/.





Similarly, the government can use a subpoena to obtain bank records that show when a
customer accessed a safe-deposit box, but it needs a warrant to search the private pa-
pers kept inside.  It may subpoena the business records containing a hotel’s guest regis-
try, but it cannot take the diary in a guest’s hotel-room drawer except through a legal
search and seizure.
Id.
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“[U]nder current rules for telephone calls, the government can more
readily obtain the metadata contained in company records about who
called what phone numbers and when than it can listen to an individ-
ual’s conversations.”215  Similarly, service providers need to ascertain
certain information to process stored communications, but the con-
tents need not to be “read” by the service provider for the customer to
utilize those services.  Although the information security community
generally accepts the notion that sender and receiver metadata is ex-
tremely difficult to completely obfuscate in the current electronic
communication infrastructure, the contents of the stored communica-
tion can be easily encrypted.216
“Another potential argument against requiring a warrant before the
government may request ISP monitoring of their subscribers’ Internet
activity focuses on the privacy policy that every user must agree to
before accessing their Internet services.”217  Nevertheless, the con-
sumer’s subjective intentions remain essential; a consumer does not
send an e-mail intending for the ISP to intercept it, but, rather, the
consumer intends to have the ISP transmit the e-mail to the recipi-
ent.218  This markedly differs from, for example, “[a] child who reveals
to a teacher that her parents abuse her”; in such an instance, the child
“loses any reasonable expectation of privacy by sharing the informa-
tion with another.”219  The intended recipient in that scenario is the
teacher.  Consequently, “[t]his differs from the communication be-
tween two private actors intercepted by an ISP, because the informa-
tion was never intentionally shared with the ISP.”220  Instead, the
subjective intention of the sender is for the ISP to transmit the infor-
mation to the recipient, which is much like sending a letter—one does
not send a letter intending that the U.S. Postal Service will read the
letter.
At a House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Secur-
ity, and Investigations hearing in 2013, Elana Tyrangiel, Acting Assis-
tant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Policy at the U.S.
215. Id.
216. See Security Now!: Tor: Not So Anonymous (Gibson Research Corporation podcast Feb.
3, 2015) (transcript at 10–12), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-493.pdf.
217. Mitter, supra note 194, at 263.  “Where the consenting party has no reasonable alterna- R
tives or choices relating to a particular term among different contractual providers, courts’ reli-
ance on a consumer’s ability to find a better offer seems misplaced.” Id. at 264. But see id.
(“Compared to the variety of e-mail providers, there is relatively little choice between Internet
providers.  Therefore, a customer is limited in his or her ability to shop around to find the pri-
vacy policy that best suits his or her needs.” (emphasis added)).
218. Id. at 273–74.
219. Id. at 274.
220. Id.
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Department of Justice, echoed the widely held view that the SCA has
“failed to keep up with the development of technology and the ways
in which we use electronic and stored communications.”221  Specifi-
cally, the Office of Legal Policy agreed “that there is no principal basis
to treat e-mail less than 180 days old differently than e-mail more than
180 days old” or treat unopened e-mails differently from opened e-
mails.222  The testimony emphasized that “[a]ll of us use e-mail and
other technologies to share personal and private information, and we
want it to be protected appropriately.”223
The SCA was enacted to provide some Fourth Amendment-like
protection for information disclosed to service providers.224  However,
the SCA no longer conforms with the average consumer’s expecta-
tions of privacy.225  This is evident from the type of information con-
sumers store with third parties226 and the public’s reaction to the
Snowden Revelations.  Edward Snowden, an ex-National Security
Agency (NSA) contractor, disclosed the NSA’s mass surveillance pro-
grams that collected a high proportion of telephone and Internet data
on U.S. citizens and residents, which far outnumbered data on legally
targeted foreign surveillance targets.227  In light of the Snowden reve-
221. ECPA (Part I): Lawful Access to Stored Content: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec. & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary.  113th
Cong. 14 (2013) (statement of Elana Tyrangiel, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Policy, U.S. Department of Justice).
222. Id. (statement of Elana Tyrangiel, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy,
U.S. Department of Justice).
223. Id. (statement of Elana Tyrangiel, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy,
U.S. Department of Justice).
224. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1212 (“The SCA addresses this imbalance by offering network R
account holders a range of statutory privacy rights against access to stored account information
held by network service providers.  The statute creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy
protections by statute, regulating the relationship between government investigators and service
providers in possession of users’ private information.”).
225. See Kim Zetter, What We Know About the NSA and AT&T’s Spying Pact, WIRED (Aug.
17, 2015, 5:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/know-nsa-atts-spying-pact/ (“In the last two
years, revelations exposing the breadth of the NSA’s surveillance, as well as the cooperation of
technology companies in helping the NSA spy, have forced the agency to curtail some of its
activity.  Some companies have also begun to push back against the agency’s requests for data in
the wake of the public’s anger about their duplicity in helping the agency spy.”).
226. This was vividly demonstrated when hackers publicly posted private “nude photos of as
many as 100 celebrities, [that were] taken from their Apple iCloud backups.” See Sean Gal-
lagher, What the Celebrity Photo Hack Can Teach Us About Cloud Security, WIRED U.K. (Sept.
2, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-09/02/j-law-cloud-security; Press Release,
Pennsylvania Man Charged with Hacking Apple and Google E-Mail Accounts Belonging to
More Than 100 People, Mostly Celebrities (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/
pennsylvania-man-charged-hacking-apple-and-google-e-mail-accounts-belonging-more-100.
227. See Barton Gellman et al., supra note 25; Andy Greenberg, Intelligence Officials Admit R
That Edward Snowden’s NSA Leaks Call for Reforms, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/09/13/intelligence-officials-admit-that-edward-
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lations, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has returned to the spot-
light.  Yet, courts continue to apply the SCA to areas that the SCA
was not designed to be applied to, and the legislature did not likely
anticipate when the SCA was enacted as part of the ECPA in 1986.228
The narrow scope of the SCA is not obvious to judges and has not
stopped them from “twist[ing] the statute to do things that it was
never intended to do.  For example, several district courts have ap-
plied the SCA to regulate the placement of electronic cookies on
home computers.”229  The SCA should not apply to electronic cookies
on home computers because “home computers are already protected
by the Fourth Amendment, so statutory protections are not
needed.”230
Stored communication is unavoidable in everyday life, and the de-
cades old SCA does not conform to modern expectations of privacy.
If Congress fails to provide adequate legal protections that conform to
modern expectations of privacy, consumers will likely adopt technical
protections that cannot be circumvented even in an emergency.  In the
face of uncertain legal protections, consumers are likely to take mat-
ters into their own hands.  Steve Gibson, a security researcher, ob-
served that consumer interest in privacy technologies, like encryption,
was a reaction to the Snowden revelations.231  Techniques to make all
wiretapping and recovery of stored information mathematically infea-
sible has been readily available for a very long time, and experts in the
information security sector have both the will and the expertise to
snowdens-leaks-call-for-reforms.  “By law, the NSA may ‘target’ only foreign nationals located
overseas unless it obtains a warrant based on probable cause from a special surveillance court.”
Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted far Outnumber the Foreign-
ers Who Are, WASH. POST, July 5, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-secur-
ity/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/
05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html.  However, Snowden revealed that NSA
surveillance programs, such as PRISM and Upstream, mass-collected information on U.S. citi-
zens and residents, and “[m]ost of the people caught up in those programs are not the targets
and would not lawfully qualify as such.” Id.  In addition, “[t]he NSA treats all content inter-
cepted incidentally from third parties as permissible to retain, store, search and distribute to its
government customers.” Id.
228. Peterson, supra note 89. R
229. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1212 (footnote omitted).  HTTP Cookies, commonly called “cook- R
ies,” are a way for websites to store and retrieve information on your device. What Are Cook-
ies?, BBC: WEBWISE (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/guides/about-cookies.
Cookies are used to store preferences and session data, but they also enable marketers to track
users. Id.
230. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1215. R
231. Security Now!: Shocked by the Shell, supra note 20 (transcript at 8). R
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help consumers utilize those techniques.232  Before the Snowden reve-
lations, more people accepted that the government had a valid interest
in intercepting and recovering limited information for investigative
purposes, such as kidnappings or terrorist activities, but interest in pri-
vacy technologies and strong encryption has increased in the wake of
the flood of high profile data breaches.233
Adoption of strong encryption for e-mails was slow because current
implementations require the users to surmount many technical hur-
dles, and, as a result, the adoption has been limited to those who are
already familiar with information security.234  However, partly in re-
sponse to the Snowden revelations, new services are being launched to
enable encrypted e-mail for users who do not have the knowledge that
is required to deploy complex solutions traditionally associated with
encrypted communications.235  There is also increased interest in in-
vestigating the underlying soundness of those solutions as the NSA
continues to try to undermine those solutions.236
Regardless of whether the government, industry, or the people
themselves should be responsible for ensuring privacy in electronic
communication,237 the use of encryption in general for web traffic has
232. Id.  (“[W]e have the technology to absolutely lock this stuff down. And it’ll take a while
for it to get deployed.  But once it has, it’s game over for the intelligence agencies.  This is not an
insolvable problem if we choose to solve the problem.”).
233. Id. (transcript at 8–9).
234. Damien Gayle, The Edward Snowden Guide to Encryption: Fugitive’s 12-Minute Home-
made Video Ahead of Leaks Explaining How To Avoid NSA from Tracking E-mails, DAILY
MAIL.COM, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2628082/The-Edward-Snowden-guide-en-
cryption-Fugitives-12-minute-homemade-video-ahead-leaks-explaining-avoid-NSA-tracking-
emails.html (last updated May 14, 2014, 8:00 AM) (“PGP and similar programs are just too
complicated for the masses . . . .  [T]hus adoption over the past 20 years has been limited to the
highly technical – the uber geeks.  Now, if a service like gmail.com had an option in there to
perform digital signing and encryption in a way that most people could use it, that would have a
huge impact.” (quoting TK Keanini, Chief Technology Officer, Lancope)).
235. These range from those that are purportedly “NSA proof,” such as ProtonMail, in which
the provider never has access to unencrypted messages, to those that hamper mass collection but
could be vulnerable if the provider is presented with a court order. See Kashmir Hill, The NSA
Gives Birth to Start-Ups, FORBES (Sept. 10, 2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill /2014/09/10/ the-nsa-gives-birth- to-start -ups /#2715e4857a0b66d19d783e08; Hollie
Slade, ‘NSA-Proof’ E-mail ProtonMail Launching Mobile App, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hollieslade/2014/08/01/nsa-proof-email-protonmail-launching-mo-
bile-app/#539a33f959e3.
236. See, e.g., Secure Messaging Scorecard, supra note 139 (listing characteristics, including R
whether messages can be decrypted by the provider, thereby making them vulnerable to govern-
ment searches and whether the code is open to and has recently been independently audited to
find backdoors or intentional undermining of the cryptography).
237. “People need to understand that when people offer free services, you and your informa-
tion are the payment.”  Gayle, supra note 234 (quoting TK Keanini, Chief Technology Officer, R
Lancope). But see Gayle, supra note 234 (“[T]here needs to be more pressure on government to R
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already increased by over 60% in the United States since the Snowden
revelations;238 thus, services that enable encryption of users’ traffic are
becoming more popular.239  Despite law enforcement and intelligence
agencies’ concerns about companies “marketing something expressly
to allow people to place themselves above the law,”240 efforts are un-
derway to make encrypted communications available to all for free.241
The only hurdle, then, is consumers’ desire and willingness to adopt
and deploy strong encryption for stored communication.  People of
the United States have already shown the capacity to increase adop-
tion of protection against a perceived threat to, or uncertainty over, a
constitutional right, particularly in the context of firearms owner-
ship.242  Firearms sales soared in response to uncertainty over consti-
tutional protection of the private ownership of firearms.243  That
fervor decreases once uncertainty is resolved.244  For firearms, produc-
stop them from snooping on the private lives of ordinary people . . . .” (quoting Mike Rispoli,
spokesman for Privacy International)).
238. Williams, supra note 135 (discussing SANDVINE, 1H 2014, GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOME- R
NON REPORT 6 (2014), https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenom-
ena/2014/1h-2014-global-internet-phenomena-report.pdf).
239. See Byron Acohido, How Free VPNs Could Return Privacy to a Social Norm, USA TO-
DAY (Nov. 9, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/11/05/how-free-
vpns-can-make-privacy-a-social-norm/3431597/.
240. Pamela Brown & Evan Perez, FBI Tells Apple, Google Their Privacy Efforts Could
Hamstring Investigations, CNN: POLITICS (Oct. 12, 2014, 8:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/
25/politics/fbi-apple-google-privacy/ (quoting James Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
241. See Martyn Casserly, How To Send Encrypted Emails the Easy Way: Get Total Email
Privacy Regardless of Your Email Provider - Works with Gmail, Hotmail and more, PC ADVISOR
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/how-to/internet/how-send-encrypted-emails-easy-g
mail-hotmail-3636950/; Worldwide Encryption Products Survey, supra note 23. R
242. See Michael Cooper, Sales of Guns Soar in U.S. as Nation Weighs Tougher Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/us/as-us-weighs-new-rules-sales-of-
guns-and-ammunition-surge.html (“When you are threatened with the possibility that you are
going to lose something, you get a bunch of it.” (quoting Rev. Laurence Hesser)); Arpita
Mukherjee & Siddharth Cavale, PREVIEW- U.S. Gun Makers Aim for Record Quarter as Curbs
Loom, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-25/news/sns-rt-gun
manufacturers-results-previewl4n0bl6es-20130224_1_gun-sales-gun-makers-newtown-shootings;
see also Sari Horwitz & Peter Finn, Untitled, WASH. POST: NAT’L SECURITY, Jan. 17, 2013, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2013/01/17/011bb7e0-60de-11e2-9940-6fc488
f3fecd_story.html. But see Frank Miniter, Opinion, What the Left Won’t Tell You About the
Boom in U.S. Gun Sales, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
frankminiter/2012/08/23/what-the-left-wont-tell-you-about-the-boom-in-u-s-gun-sales/2/ (expl-
aining that the surge in gun sales began in 2005, years before the proposed legislation).
243. Gregor Aisch & Josh Keller, Gun Sales Soar After Obama Calls for New Restrictions,
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/10/us/gun-sales-terrorism-obama-re-
strictions.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2016).
244. See, e.g., Aaron Smith, Gun Sales Are Plunging, CNN: MONEY (Feb. 14, 2014, 12:01 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/14/news/companies/guns-ammo-sales/ (noting that the frenetic
pace of purchasing guns and ammunition subsided when fear of increased legislation dissipated).
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tion speed is a mitigating factor; there may be an increased demand,
but supplies are limited to production, and it takes time to increase
production.245  However, the elasticity provided by the cloud allows
service providers to quickly respond to increased demand for services,
and this limit does not prevent adoption of strong encryption provided
by cloud services.246  Therefore, the most appropriate and feasible
way to avoid a world in which warrants are essentially useless against
all ESI is to conform legal protections to modern expectations of pri-
vacy and, therefore, disincentivize the mass adoption of strong
encryption.
Consumers do not have a meaningful choice over whether to use
stored communications, but they do have a choice over whether to
adopt services that protect such communications with strong
encryption.
IV. IMPACT
If legal protection is not clarified to alleviate consumer anxieties
about mass surveillance and warrantless searches, uncertainties re-
garding Fourth Amendment protection of consumer information will
likely lead to mass adoption of strong encryption.  Mass adoption of
strong encryption will lead to dire security, social, and economic
implications.
A. Potential Security Implications Surrounding the Mass Adoption
of Strong Encryption
If strong encryption is widely adopted, law enforcement would have
no access to protected information even with a court order.  In an
emergency, law enforcement and intelligence agencies may be able to
serve a court order to a provider or break down a physical door, but
no one can break the mathematical principles that underlie strong en-
cryption.247  Law enforcement officials are already subjected to an in-
crease in devices that they cannot access because of encryption, and
this change has been swift.248  It is clear that strong encryption already
causes a problem for law enforcement because “[p]rosecutors have
now [resorted to] the All Writs Act, an 18th-century federal law that
simply allows courts to issue a writ, or order, which compels a person
245. See Cooper, supra note 242. R
246. See generally MELL & GRANCE, supra note 19, at 2 (noting the rapid elasticity of cloud R
computing); infra notes 108–48 (describing how cloud computing is linked to strong encryption) R
247. See Security Now!: Poodle Bites (Gibson Research Corporation podcast Oct. 21, 2014)
(transcript at 3), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-478.pdf.
248. Id.
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or company to do something.”249  In fact, some police departments
whose own data has been maliciously encrypted and held at ransom
had no choice but to pay that ransom.250
Strong encryption deployed in stored communication presents
much of the same challenges.  If these techniques are widely adopted,
the problem can no longer be solved with court orders because the
decryption would be computationally infeasible.251  Requiring disclo-
sure of encryption keys protecting content may be viewed as testimo-
nial and trigger Fifth Amendment protection.252  “Something you
are,” such as a fingerprint, or “something you have,” such as a hard
drive, do not implicate the Fifth Amendment.  However, encryption
keys are “something you know,” and the Eleventh Circuit held that
“decryption and production of the contents of the hard drives would
sufficiently implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege.”253
To fulfill consumer demands, companies may also decide to place
data centers outside of the United States to insulate them from
249. Cyrus Farivar, Feds Want Apple’s Help To Defeat Encrypted Phones, New Legal Case
Shows, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 1, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/12/feds-
want-apples-help-to-defeat-encrypted-phones-new-legal-case-shows/; e.g., In re Search of an Ap-
ple Iphone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California
License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).  In a
recent case, the FBI sought an order to compel Apple to help it conduct a brute-force passcode
attack on an iPhone used by one of the shooters in the 2015 San Bernadino attack.  Orin Kerr,
Opinion, Preliminary Thoughts on the Apple iPhone Order in the San Bernardino Case (Part 1),
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/18/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-apple-iphone-order-in-the-san-
bernardino-case-part-1/.  However, this case does not directly implicate the Fourth Amendment
because the government has a search warrant but sought “Apple’s help in carrying out the war-
rant that the government already has.” Id.  The FBI has since indicated it no longer needs Ap-
ple’s assistance in that specific case; however, many other similar cases remain.  Eliza Sweren-
Becker, This Map Shows How the Apple-FBI Fight Was About Much More than One Phone,
ACLU (Mar. 30, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/map-shows-how-apple-
fbi-fight-was-about-much-more-one-phone.
250. See, e.g., Gregory Pratt, Midlothian Cops Pay Ransom To Retrieve Data from Hacker,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-midlothian-
hacker-ransom-met-20150220-story.html. See also, e.g., Hospital Declares ‘Internal State of
Emergency’ After Ransomware Infection, KREBS ON SECURITY (Mar. 22, 2016), https://krebson-
security.com/2016/03/hospital-declares-internet-state-of-emergency-after-ransomware-infection/.
251. See Security Now!: Poodle Bites, supra note 247 (transcript at 12–13).  “[M]ath is funda- R
mentally unbreakable.  We have unbreakable math.”  And the fact that we’ve been maybe some-
what lackadaisical in deploying it or enforcing it doesn’t mean that it’s not available to us.  And
it really hasn’t taken long at all.” Id. (transcript at 3).  “[T]here may be vulnerabilities in the
specific implementations of unbreakable math. Security Now!: The (In)Security of 2014 (Gibson
Research Corporation podcast Dec. 30, 2014) (transcript at 31), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-
488.pdf (“And we have great math. It is implementation vulnerabilities, and there are some
architectures which are weak. The architecture of the public key system is weak.”).
252. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335,
1346 (11th Cir. 2012).
253. See id.
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searches.254  This will not only have an economic impact on the United
States,255 but it is also antithetical to the Internet as a distributed “me-
dium without borders”256  Many companies that are concerned about
overreach by intelligence agencies from other countries, are turning to
Swiss data centers for protection.257  Imposing such drastic geographic
restrictions on the location of the data centers will do little to curb the
adoption of strong encryption; these actions will only “break the In-
ternet,”258 restrict the free flow of information that enables technolog-
ical and social advancements, and diminish the functionality of a
system designed to provide redundancies irrespective of geography.
B. Potential Social and Economic Implications Surrounding the
Mass Adoption or Prohibition of Strong Encryption
Concerns over mass Internet surveillance have prompted interest in
encryption,259 and some commentators have argued that the solution
is to ban strong encryption or to require all implementations to have
built in undisclosed backdoors.260  Others suggest allowing law en-
254. Julian Hattem, Google Chief on NSA: ‘We’re Going To End Up Breaking the Internet,’
HILL (Oct. 8, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/220176-google-head-without-
reform-nsa-will-break-the-internet.
255. See DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL PRISM
COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY? 3 (Aug. 2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-
computing-costs.pdf (“On the low end, U.S. cloud computing providers might lose $21.5 billion
over the next three years. . . .  On the high end, U.S. cloud computing providers might lose $35.0
billion by 2016.”); Tom Groenfeldt, Gov Spying Boosts Swiss Data Center Revenues, FORBES
(July 4, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2013/07/04/gov-spying-
boosts-swiss-data-center-revenues/.
256. Hattem, supra note 254. R
257. Groenfeldt, supra note 255 (“Mateo Meier, director at Artmotion, Switzerland’s biggest R
offshore hosting company, said revenues grew 45 to 50 percent last year as companies from
industries as varied as oil and gas to technology to finance look for a place to store confidential
data.”). But see August 2013 Web Server Survey, NETCRAFT (Aug. 9, 2013), http://
news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/08/09/august-2013-web-server-survey.html (“Despite specula-
tion that the recent PRISM revelations would result in a mass exodus from American data cen-
ters and web hosting companies, Netcraft has not yet seen any evidence of this.”).
258. Hattem, supra note 254. R
By creating national barriers to data, data localization measures break up the World
Wide Web, which was designed to share information across the globe.  The Internet is a
global network based on a protocol for interconnecting computers without regard for
national borders. Information is routed across this network through decisions made
autonomously and automatically at local routers, which choose paths based largely on
efficiency, unaware of political borders.
Anupam Chander & Uyeˆn P. Leˆ, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 680 (2015) (footnote
omitted).
259. Secure Messaging Scorecard, supra note 139.
260. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, FBI Official: It’s America’s Choice Whether We Want To Be Spied
On, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 4, 2015 10:42 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/11/fbi-offi
cial-its-americas-choice-whether-we-want-to-be-spied-on/ (providing the viewpoint of James
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL302.txt unknown Seq: 38 17-OCT-16 9:30
1130 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1093
forcement to have documented “exceptional access” to encrypted
materials, such as key escrow, which is third-party storage of encryp-
tion keys in escrow.261  These prohibitions on encryption would mean
joining the ranks of China, Iran, and Russia.262
More importantly, these suggestions are inherently unworkable be-
cause they would introduce unacceptable weaknesses to the very core
of what makes encryption secure.263  In fact, the information security
industry recognizes the necessity of “forward secrecy” in stored com-
munication.264  Forward secrecy ensures that past communication can-
not be decrypted by a compromised key because each key is only used
for one session, which is another barrier to exceptional access.265  The
technology is already widely supported by browsers and servers, and
companies are already aggressively adopting the use for normal trans-
actions with consumers.266  If domestic companies are required to
maintain encryption keys to decrypt past communication, it would
mean “[turning] back the clock on this substantial improvement in se-
curity . . . to dramatically improve functional security” while compa-
Baker, General Counsel, FBI); Chris Strohm & Del Quentin Wilber, Paris Attacks Renew Call
for Access to Encrypted Messages, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-11-16/paris-attacks-renew-u-s-call-to-access-encrypted-communications (pro-
viding the viewpoints of Senator Dianne Feinstein, Representative Michael McCaul, and Senator
John McCain). See generally ABELSON ET AL., THE RISKS OF KEY RECOVERY, KEY ESCROW,
AND TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY ENCRYPTION (rev. 1998), https://www.schneier.com/cryptography/
archives/1997/04/the_risks_of_key_rec.html (describing the requirements and proposals of key
recovery); Cory Bennett, Activists up Pressure on White House To Reject Encryption Bill, HILL
(Apr. 11, 2016, 5:15 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/275885-activists-up-pressure-on-
white-house-to-reject-encryption-bill (discussing the “Compliance with Court Orders Act of
2016” draft measure from Senators Richard Burr and Dianne Feinstein).
261. See, e.g., Mike Rogers, Encryption a Growing Threat to Security, CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/2015/08/01/opinions/rogers-encryption-security-risk/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2015,
7:57 AM). But see Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety
and Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 15–16 (July 8, 2015)
(statement of Peter Swire, Professor of Law & Ethics, Scheller College of Business, Georgia
Institute of Technology), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-08-
15%20Swire%20Testimony.pdf (arguing that exceptional access would increase costs and de-
crease security).
262. Nicholas Watt, PM’s Plans To Monitor Encrypted Messages ‘Would Turn UK into China,’
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2015 9:09 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/16/david-cam-
eron-plan-monitor-encrypted-messages-challenge.
263. HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., KEYS UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY RE-
QUIRING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS 15–17 (June 7, 2015),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2158970/data-security-report.pdf.
264. Security Now!: SQRL Revisited (Gibson Research Corporation podcast July 14, 2015)
(transcript at 10), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-516.pdf.
265. Id. (transcript at 11).
266. Id.
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nies outside of the United States would be free to offer this function,
which would put domestic companies at a disadvantage.267
Congress previously tried to curb the adoption of strong encryption
by banning it outright; however, this was largely unsuccessful.268  The
“Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 and the International
Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which was revised in 1992, se-
verely restrict [U.S.] companies from exporting any and all military
and intelligence related technologies[,]” including strong encryp-
tion.269  The “mathematical algorithms on which cryptography is
based” were famously “classified as military technologies” and placed
on the same list regulating the export of munitions, sharing space on a
list with “tanks, fighter jets, and aircraft carriers.”270
Not only were domestic companies put at a disadvantage in the
market for encryption software, but cryptographers and activists
found “success in propagating strong cryptography.271  Thus, encryp-
tion software was made available on the Internet, making it “available
worldwide to anybody with a computer and a modem, so it had in
effect been exported without the prior approval of the [U.S.] State
Department” despite restrictions on exporting of encryption
software.272
In practice, trying to ban encryption is comparable to trying to ban
the spread of an idea;273 the algorithms behind strong encryption can
easily be described in a few short paragraphs (which comfortably fit
within the footnote to this sentence) and implemented by relatively
267. See id.
268. Security Now!: The Enigma Machine (Gibson Research Corporation podcast Jan. 13,
2015) (transcript at 14), https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-490.pdf.  Previous attempts by the U.S. gov-
ernment to regulate encryption technologies did little to stop the spread of strong encryption.
Id.  The renewed interest in the United Kingdom for this type of scheme to unilaterally prevent
people from using strong encryption will likely fail as well because adequate enforcement is
simply unrealistic. Id.  (“Are they going to throw everybody [who uses strong encryption] in jail
. . . ?”).
269. Michael Schwartzbeck, The Evolution of US Government Restrictions on Using and Ex-
porting Encryption Technologies (U), ENCRYPTION TECH. 21, 23–24 (Top Secret document, ap-
proved for release Sept. 10, 2014) (footnotes omitted), http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/
DOC_0006231614.pdf.
270. Id. at 24. See generally Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §2751 (2012); International
Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§120.1–.32 (2011).
271. Id. (footnote omitted).
272. Id.
273. Activists have lampooned these restrictions by wearing shirts “with the source code for
the RSA encryption system printed on the front.  At the time the shirt was created, the United
States government’s export laws forbade taking the shirt from the country.”  Peter Wayner,
Cryptography and Paranoia in Anguilla, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, http://partners.nytimes.com/
library/cyber/week/030497anguilla.html.
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simple programming.274  Therefore, banning strong encryption or re-
quiring backdoors will do nothing to stop the propagation of strong
encryption to those who wish to access it.275  Further, it will only lead
to a repeat of the economic impact on domestic companies.276  The
nature of the Internet makes it easy for consumers to go beyond bor-
ders, and the cloud makes it easy for the companies to accommodate
essentially unlimited consumer demand.  The very systems that enable
cloud computing would also allow easy access to services provided by
companies in countries that do not have restrictions on the use of
strong encryption.  In addition, modern commerce is simply impossi-
ble without strong encryption.277  Public interest is better served by
274. For example, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, which “is a method for two
computer users to generate a shared private key with which they can then exchange information
across an insecure channel” and is the basis of many key exchange protocols, can be described in
this relatively short section of text:
Let the users be named Alice and Bob.  First, they agree on two prime numbers g and
p, where p is large (typically at least 512 bits) and g is a primitive root modulo p. (In
practice, it is a good idea to choose p such that p − 1)/2 is also prime.)  The numbers g
and p need not be kept secret from other users.  Now Alice chooses a large random
number a as her private key and Bob similarly chooses a large number b.  Alice then
computes A = ga(mod p), which she sends to Bob, and Bob computes B = gb(mod p),
which he sends to Alice.
Now both Alice and Bob compute their shared key K = gab(mod p), which Alice
computes as
K = Ba(mod p)
and Bob computes as
K = Ab(mod p) = (ga)b (mod p)
[Because (xm) = xmn and, therefore, (gb)a = (ga)b = gab,] Alice and Bob can now use
their shared key K to exchange information without worrying about other users ob-
taining this information. In order for a potential eavesdropper (Eve) to do so, she
would first need to obtain K = gab (mod p) knowing only g, p, A = ga(mod p) and B =
gb(mod p).
This can be done by computing a from A = ga (mod p) and b from B = gb (mod p).
This is the discrete logarithm problem, which is computationally infeasible for large p.
Computing the discrete logarithm of a number modulo takes roughly the same amount
of time as factoring the product of two primes the same size as p, which is what the
security of the RSA cryptosystem relies on. Thus, the Diffie-Hellman protocol is
roughly as secure as RSA.
David Terr, Diffie-Hellman Protocol, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/
Diffie-HellmanProtocol.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  This mathematical principle is easily
memorized, making the restrictions on this type of technology comparable to the restrictions on
ideas.
275. Security Now!: Listener Feedback 217, supra note 121 (“[T]he cat’s out of the bag.  Bad R
guys will use bulletproof, unbreakable crypto, which at the moment everybody’s using.  But if it
turns out that that’s illegal, then they’ll keep using it, and everybody else will just have law
enforcement-breakable crypto.”).
276. See HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., supra note 263, at 1, 17. R
277. See id. at 8–10.
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the ubiquitous availability of strong encryption used in regular trans-
actions that make modern commerce possible.278  Modern commerce
simply will not work without sufficient information security.
Failure to recognize and protect the expectation of privacy in ESI
will also lead to unexpected results for those who have a duty to keep
information secure.  Legal protection is indispensable when technical
solutions are impractical.  For example, the American Bar Association
recognized a general reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails.
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 states: “A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by
[other provisions in the Rules].”279  In addition, “[a] lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclo-
sure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client.”280  Comments to the Model Rules note that the
lawyer is not required to use special security measures if the “method
of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy.”281
The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
concluded that a lawyer may communicate with the client by unen-
crypted e-mail “because the mode of transmission affords a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy from a technological and legal
standpoint.”282
Plaintext electronic communication does not provide privacy from a
technological standpoint, and information security best practices
would urge requiring all lawyers to encrypt communications with cli-
ents.283  The legal community is left with two options: (1) require all
communication with clients to be protected by strong encryption or
(2) change the ethical rules to allow plaintext communication and rely
278. Mike McConnell et al., Why the Fear over Ubiquitous Data Encryption Is Overblown,
WASH. POST, July 28, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-need-for-ubiquitous-
data-encryption/2015/07/28/3d145952-324e-11e5-8353-1215475949f4_story.html (“We believe
that the greater public good is a secure communications infrastructure protected by ubiquitous
encryption at the device, server and enterprise level without building in means for government
monitoring.”).
279. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
280. Id. at r. 1.6(c).
281. Id. at r. 1.6. cmt. 19.
282. Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459,
DUTY TO PROTECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF E-MAIL COMMUNICATION WITH ONE’S CLIENT
(Aug. 2011).
283. Nevertheless, it would be illogical for any lawyer to argue, on the one hand, that expecta-
tion of privacy in e-mails is diminished in the Fourth Amendment context yet, on the other hand,
maintain that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails, and, therefore, it is ethical
to send unencrypted e-mails to clients.
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on legal protections.  The former makes information inaccessible,
even with a warrant, without cooperation from someone who holds
the encryption keys and the latter leaves clients more vulnerable to
information leaks.
Adhering to consumers’ demands for privacy, the information tech-
nology industry responded by marketing privacy as a feature.284
WhatsApp, the instant messaging platform acquired by Facebook in
2014, worked with Open Whisper Systems to implement the Text-
Secure protocol.285  As of February 2016, WhatsApp has more than
one billion monthly active users.286  The ubiquity of WhatsApp makes
it convenient to communicate with anyone securely without any bur-
densome preparation.287  In 2016, WhatsApp enabled end-to-end en-
cryption by default for all users through the improved Signal protocol,
and “[t]he result is practically uncrackable encryption” for the “most
popular messaging app in the world, where people exchange billions
of messages a day.”288  With the Signal protocol, “WhatsApp
messages will now travel all the way to the recipients’ device before
being decrypted, rather than merely being encrypted between the
user’s device and WhatsApp’s server.”289
Jan Koum, WhatsApp founder who grew “up in Soviet Ukraine in
the 1980s,” credits his distrust of government surveillance with the de-
cision to enable encryption.290  Many other messaging platforms pro-
vide similar encryption functionality for other security conscious
consumers.291  Without clear legal protections, more companies will
284. See, e.g., Security Now!: The (In)Security of 2014, supra note 251 (transcript at 31). R
285. Stephanie Mlot, WhatsApp Surpasses 700M Users, PCMAG (Jan. 7, 2015, 10:16 AM)
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2474750,00.asp (discussing Apple’s and Google’s
response).
286. Samuel Gibbs, WhatsApp and Gmail Join the 1 Billion User Club, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2,
2016, 6:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/02/whatsapp-gmail-google-
facebook-user-app.
287. Jethro Mullen, What Is ISIS’ Appeal for Young People?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/
02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/ (last updated Feb. 25, 2015, 2:33 PM).
288. Cyrus Farivar, WhatsApp Is Now Most Widely Used End-to-End Crypto Tool on the
Planet, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 5, 2016, 9:02 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/
whatsapp-is-now-most-widely-used-end-to-end-crypto-tool-on-the-planet/; Andy Greenberg,
Whatsapp Just Switched on End-to-End Encryption for Hundreds of Millions of Users, WIRED
(Nov. 18, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsapp-encrypted-messaging/.
289. Farivar, supra note 288; Greenberg, supra note 288.  The signal protocol also implements R
perfect forward secrecy, so even if encryption keys are compromised, they cannot be used to
decrypt previously transmitted messages.  Farivar, supra note 288. R
290. Id.  (“I grew up in a society where everything you did was eavesdropped on, recorded,
snitched on . . . .  Nobody should have the right to eavesdrop, or you become a totalitarian
state—the kind of state I escaped as a kid to come to this country where you have democracy
and freedom of speech. Our goal is to protect it.” (quoting Jan Koum, WhatsApp founder)).
291. See Secure Messaging Scorecard, supra note 139. R
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make strong encryption available, and more consumers will adopt
strong encryption, leading to a world in which not even a warrant can
make information available to law enforcement.292
Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith warns of heavy repercus-
sions for domestic tech companies if intelligence agencies continue to
conduct mass surveillance293  Concerns over privacy may push con-
sumers to utilize the cloud “because big tech companies have the re-
sources to properly secure data.”294  And, if legal protections are not
clear in the United States, consumers can simply choose to utilize ser-
vices provided by foreign companies operating infrastructures outside
of the United States and far out of law enforcement’s reach, even with
probable cause and search warrants.  In fact, many companies already
locate servers outside of the United States to comply with the more
stringent privacy regulations in the European Union as well as to mar-
ket the location of the servers as a special feature to consumers.295
However, if legal protections conform with modern privacy expec-
tations, consumers are more likely to continue using services offered
by domestic companies, and many companies may continue to situate
servers in the United States.296  If the servers remain within the
United States, and if consumers do not adopt strong encryption en
masse, the data will remain within the reach of law enforcement
through warrants.297
Many hold the belief that “I have nothing to hide; therefore, I have
nothing to worry about.”298  During a conference regarding privacy
and cybercrime at Georgetown Law, Judge Richard Posner, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, agreed with that senti-
292. However, when a perceived threat to a constitutional right is removed, people have less
incentive to take matters into their own hands. See, e.g., Aaron Smith, Gun Sales Are Plunging,
CNN MONEY (Feb. 14, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/14/news/companies/guns-
ammo-sales/.
293. Jack Clark, Microsoft: NSA Security Fallout ‘Getting Worse’ . . . ‘Not Blowing Over,’
REGISTER (June 19, 2014, 6:30 PM),  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/19/microsoft_
nsa_fallout/ (“If the US government does not work to clear up the rules around how it intercepts
data both at home and abroad, how deeply its spy agencies penetrate tech from its domestic
companies, and how it accesses overseas data held by American companies, then there’s a real
danger that US companies could suffer . . . .”).
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., THREEMA: THE BEST-SELLING SECURE MESSENGER (Sept. 10, 2014), https://
threema.ch/press-files/1_press_info/Press-Info_Threema_EN.pdf.
296. August 2013 Web Server Survey, supra note 257. R
297. Contra Warrant To Search Microsoft E-mail Accounts, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (arguing that Congress intended an ISP to produce information regardless of
where that information is stored).
298. Moxie Marlinspike, Why ‘I Have Nothing to Hide’ Is the Wrong Way To Think About
Surveillance, WIRED (June 13, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/06/why-i-have-noth-
ing-to-hide-is-the-wrong-way-to-think-about-surveillance/.
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ment.299  Judge Posner stated that “lawmakers should give the NSA
‘carte blanche’” and that “[i]f the NSA wants to vacuum all the tril-
lions of bits of information that are crawling through the electronic
worldwide networks, I think that’s fine.”300  Judge Posner also “criti-
cized mobile OS companies [(such as Google and Apple)] for ena-
bling end-to-end encryption in their newest software.”301
However, Judge Margaret McKeown of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit spoke at the same event and disagreed with
Judge Posner.302  Judge McKeown warned that “[w]ith much of U.S.
privacy law based on a reasonable expectation of privacy, it’s difficult
. . . to define what that means when people are voluntarily sharing all
kinds of personal information online.”303  David Cole, Georgetown
University Law Center Professor, noted that the “U.S. and other gov-
ernments have a long history of targeting people ‘who they are con-
cerned about because they have political views and political positions
that the government doesn’t approve of.’”304  U.S. Department of Jus-
tice Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben took an even stronger
position, noting that a “certain degree of privacy is perhaps a precon-
dition for freedom, political freedom, artistic freedom, [and] personal
autonomy.”305
Regardless of the lofty principles of freedom and privacy, mass
adoption of encryption would have immediate and practical implica-
tions for both personal and national security and economics.  Without
sufficient legal protections, consumers may be sufficiently motivated
to utilize readily available and easy to deploy services hosted in coun-
tries with legal protections that do conform to their expectations of
privacy, which would make information inaccessible to law enforce-
ment even with a warrant.
V. CONCLUSION
ESI should enjoy the same treatment as the other forms of commu-
nication and storage that it is rapidly replacing.  Even if mass adoption
299. Grant Gross, Judge: Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data, PCWORLD (Dec. 5,
2014,  7:49 AM), http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/561258/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-
digital-data/.
300. Id. (quoting Judge Posner).
301. Gross, supra note 299 (“I’m shocked at the thought that a company would be permitted R
to manufacture an electronic product that the government would not be able to search . . . .”
(quoting Judge Richard Posner)).
302. Id. (quoting Judge Margaret McKeown).
303. Id.
304. Id. (quoting David Cole, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center).
305. Id. (quoting Michael Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice).
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of encryption is inevitable or, perhaps, preferable, the laws governing
search and seizure of ESI must reflect modern expectations of privacy,
and the decades-old SCA no longer conforms to these expectations of
privacy.  Without clear legal protections, consumers are likely to
adopt strong encryption that cannot be circumvented by law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies.  Consequently, Congress must amend
the SCA to: (1) explicitly protect remote storage in addition to com-
munication; (2) eliminate the arbitrary 180-day rule; (3) uphold search
warrant requirements despite the third-party doctrine; (4) and rebuild
the trust between the government and the people of the United
States.
With clear legal protections for ESI that conform to modern expec-
tations of privacy, consumers would be less likely to adopt strong en-
cryption en masse, and would be more likely to continue using
services provided by domestic companies.  The practical consequences
of clear legal protection for information consumers store with service
providers are far from helping criminals elude law enforcement.  It
may be the only way for law enforcement to dissuade mass adoption
of strong encryption, maintain access to the information law enforce-
ment needs in emergencies, and avoid a world in which a warrant
would mean nothing more than the possibility of holding the encryp-
tion key owner in contempt while law enforcement makes futile at-
tempts to guess the encryption key, and the passage of time renders
the information useless.
Wei Chen Lin*
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